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The decision to cross-list and the associated outcomes on corporate structure, strategies, 
and decisions is well-advanced. The reported outcomes range from access to foreign capital, 
broader analyst coverage, better information environment, improved liquidity, better corporate 
governance, and enhanced revenue. Such outcomes are said to motivate the cross-listing 
decision and are significantly associated with corporate and market characteristics. However, 
studies on how dynamics in corporate and market characteristics interact to drive cross-listing 
decisions are limited. Again, studies on the subsequent impact of cross-listing on other 
corporate decisions and strategies are lacking. This thesis expands the existing literature by 
providing three essays on how dynamics in firm and market characteristics influence cross-
listing decisions. It also shows how the associated outcomes of cross-listing impact ensuing 
corporate decisions and strategies. 
The first study focuses on the dividend smoothing strategies of foreign firms. It 
examines how commitment to full disclosure through cross-listing in the US influence dividend 
smoothing behavior. While questions on the determinants and channels of dividend smoothing 
are not new, how cross-listing impacts these determinants and channels have not yet been 
studied. The study is based on the premise that cross-listing in the US signals commitment to 
full disclosure. Also, it is typically associated with improved transparency and increased 
investor and analyst coverage: reducing information asymmetry and agency conflicts. Again, 
it is widely argued that the levels of information asymmetry and agency cost significantly 
influence dividend smoothing practices, while investment and debt are among the primary 
channels for dividend smoothing practices. We, therefore, examine how commitment to full 
disclosure and improved transparency due to cross-listing impacts the dividend smoothing 




adjustment model, and a variance decomposition approach to study the dividend policies of 
firms after cross-listing. 
 The results show increased dividend smoothing after cross-listing with significant 
sectoral variations in dividend smoothing strategies. We also document that firms from 
developing economies exhibit a lower increase in dividend smoothing after cross-listing 
compared to firms from developed economies. Adopting a variance decomposition approach, 
we find evidence of essential differences in the use of debt and investment channels before and 
after cross-listing to smooth net income shocks.  Overall, our findings suggest that managers 
of cross-listed firms are motivated to ensure minimal fluctuations to dividends due to the 
information content of dividend payment. The results also indicate that firms use financing 
decisions to keep dividends smooth.  
  The second study focuses on how market characteristics interact with firm 
characteristics to influence cross-listing decisions and the choice of the host market. The study 
examines how the specialization in the output of the local and host markets impacts cross-
listing decisions and the selection of the host market in the presence of other firm-level 
characteristics. This study builds on the existing macroeconomic literature that maintains that 
economies are specialized in their output, suggesting potential high competition for funding, 
among other forms of competition. Given this basis, we propose two arguments. One, 
specialization in national output could encourage firms to seek funds from other foreign 
markets through cross-listing. Two, specialization in national output could make the local 
market attractive to international firms. 
We implement a gravity model on a sample of 1779 firms from OECD countries for 20 
years and find that specialization in output in the local and host markets significantly influences 




we report that firms from countries that are specialized in specific industries undertake more 
cross-listing compared to firms from markets that are not. Interestingly, we document that firms 
from specialized markets cross-list to markets that are less specialized in the same industry. 
While the findings suggest that firms seek diversification of funding opportunities in the cross-
listing decision and the choice of the host market, they also indicate the weakening of the 
gravity restrictions in line with recent studies.  
The role of market characteristics in influencing corporate decisions and strategies is 
conventional. However, recent studies document a growing influence of policy uncertainty on 
corporate decisions. The third essay builds on this premise and examines how economic policy 
uncertainty (EPU) in the local and global markets impacts corporate cross-listing decisions. It 
employs firm- and country-level motivated by the availability of the EPU data. The 
examination commences with the implementation of an initial Granger Causality test. The 
study then adopts two contemporary approaches; a Quantile on Quantile Regression approach, 
and a Wavelet Coherence approach to allow a comprehensive understanding of the relationship.  
 
The results show that local and global EPU influence the cross-listing decisions of 
firms, with a more substantial influence on firms from smaller domestic markets. The empirical 
evidence suggests that firms from smaller local markets pursue more cross-listing in the face 
of high local EPU and reduce or avoid cross-listing during periods of high global EPU. The 
Quantile on Quantile Regression approach and the Wavelet Coherence approach document 
important dynamics between EPU and cross-listing decisions at different frequencies and 
periods, with a stronger relationship reported at higher frequencies of EPU. In addition to 
contributing to the existing literature, our findings suggest that policy transparency could have 








I am eternally grateful to God Almighty for the strength to go through this process. He 
is faithful, indeed. I take this opportunity to appreciate several individuals for their unwavering 
support during my Ph.D. journey. 
I want to express my utmost gratitude to my principal supervisor, Associate Professor 
Faruk Balli, for his relentless guidance, patience, and support. All the late-night and early 
morning emails to address my queries, concerns, and comments shaped this thesis and my 
attitude towards work. I would not be here without your support and guidance. 
My gratitude goes to my co-supervisors, Associate Professor Russell Gregory- Allen 
and Associate Professor Hatice Ozer-Balli, for their excellent guidance and support. Your 
methodological and write-up insights have been vital in shaping much of this thesis. Thank you 
for all the encouragement and life discussions. 
Special thanks to Professor Xiaoming Li, Dr. Hung Do, Dr. Liping Zou, Dr. George 
Wu, Professor Nick Nguyen, and Professor Sasha Molchanov for all the teaching and marking 
opportunities.  
 I am grateful to the School of Economics and Finance, Albany, for the assistance 
during these years and the funding provided for all three conferences. Special thanks to 
Muharram Azizova and Myrah Corrales for their support and for making sure Ph.D. students 
remain sane during this journey. Thank you to the Massey University Scholarships office for 
the 2019 conference grant.   
I would like to appreciate my Ph.D. colleagues and friends, Narongdech Thakerngkiat, 
Iftekhar Chowdhury, Hasan Mudassar, Dr. Subodh Deb Nath, and Mohammed Abubakr 
Naeem, for their support and essential discussions on research and non-research matters.  
I owe immense gratitude to my parents, Kwabena Agyeman and Rose Agyeman, for all 




Agyeman, Obed Agyeman, and Amos Agyeman for encouraging me during this journey. My 
gratitude goes to my in-law, Emma Koomson, for her encouragement. I am grateful to Rev. 
Michael Ankumah, Pastor Sef Ulugia, Pastor Debbie Ulugia, for the pastoral care and support. 
To the Elim and Mountain Missions fraternities, thank you for your prayers. 
I am grateful to all conference participants and discussants who provided some critical 
inputs in shaping the individual essays in this thesis. I would also like to thank all anonymous 
referees for their comments on earlier versions of each essay.  
Finally, I dedicate this thesis to my lovely wife, Akosua Agyemang, and my daughter, 
Janice Agyemang, for making the ultimate sacrifice of allowing me to stay late, work 
weekends, and being my backbone during these years of my Ph.D. studies.     
  















TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................ i 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...................................................................................................... iv 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................ ix 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................................... xi 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................. xii 
CHAPTER ONE ........................................................................................................................ 1 
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Main Findings and Contributions to Existing Literature ................................................. 7 
1.3 Research Outputs from the thesis ................................................................................... 11 
1.3.1 Essay 1 ..................................................................................................................... 11 
1.3.2 Essay 2 ..................................................................................................................... 11 
1.3.3 Essay 3 ..................................................................................................................... 11 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis.................................................................................................... 12 
CHAPTER TWO ..................................................................................................................... 13 
Bonding Hypothesis: A dividend smoothing perspective .................................................... 13 
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 13 
2.2   Related Literature ......................................................................................................... 19 




2.2.2 Corporate Governance and Dividend Payout Policy ............................................... 20 
2.2.3 Corporate Governance and Dividend Smoothing .................................................... 21 
2.2.4 Channels of Dividend Payout smoothing ................................................................ 23 
2.3 Data and Summary Statistics ......................................................................................... 25 
2.4 Methodology .................................................................................................................. 27 
2.4.1 Baseline Model ........................................................................................................ 27 
2.4.2 Change in dividend smoothing after cross-listing ................................................... 28 
2.4.3 Determinants of payout smoothing (Overall and after cross-listing) ...................... 32 
2.4.4 Decomposition of Net Income Smoothing Channels .............................................. 35 
2.4.4.1 Channels of smoothing for firms from developed and developing markets ......... 42 
2.5 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 46 
Appendix .............................................................................................................................. 48 
CHAPTER THREE ................................................................................................................. 52 
Cross-listing Decisions and Specialization in Output .......................................................... 52 
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 52 
3.2 Related Literature ........................................................................................................... 56 
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics ....................................................................................... 59 
3.4 Methodology .................................................................................................................. 68 
3.5 Estimation Results and Analysis .................................................................................... 70 
3.5.1 Firm-Level Analysis ................................................................................................ 70 




3.5.3 Robustness Checks: Dynamic GMM model analysis .............................................. 77 
3.6 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 83 
Appendix .............................................................................................................................. 85 
CHAPTER FOUR .................................................................................................................... 88 
Cross-Listing flows under uncertainty: an international perspective ................................... 88 
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 88 
4.2 Related Literature ........................................................................................................... 93 
4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics ....................................................................................... 97 
4.4 Empirical Analysis ....................................................................................................... 100 
4.4.1 Granger Causality .................................................................................................. 100 
4.4.2 Quantile on Quantile Estimation ........................................................................... 102 
4.4.3 Quantile on Quantile Regression Results .............................................................. 105 
4.4.4 Wavelet Coherence ................................................................................................ 113 
4.4.5 Wavelet Coherence Analysis ................................................................................. 115 
4.5 Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 122 
CHAPTER FIVE ................................................................................................................... 125 
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 125 
5.1 Future Research Areas .............................................................................................. 131 









List of Tables 
 
 
Table 2. 1: SOA: Overall Period and the Period After Cross-Listing (Entire Sample) ........... 28 
Table 2. 2: Difference between Developed and Developing Economies’ change in Speed of 
Adjustment (SOA) After Cross-Listing ................................................................................... 30 
Table 2. 3: Differences in Speed of Adjustment (SOA) After Cross-Listing by Sector .......... 31 
Table 2. 4 Cross-sectional Estimation of the determinants of SOA ........................................ 34 
Table 2. 5: The decomposition of the Net Income Smoothing via Different Channels ( Entire 
Sample). ................................................................................................................................... 42 
Table 2. 6: The decomposition of the Net Income Smoothing via Different Channels 
(Developed and Developing Countries)................................................................................... 45 
Table A. 1: Sample Distribution .............................................................................................. 48 
Table A. 2: Summary Statistics ............................................................................................... 49 
Table A. 3: Pairwise Correlation between Main Variables ..................................................... 50 
Table A. 4: Variable definition and source .............................................................................. 51 
Table 3. 1: Descriptive Statistics for Firm-level Analysis ....................................................... 63 
Table 3. 2: Correlation Matrix (Firm-Level) ........................................................................... 64 
Table 3. 3: Descriptive Statistics for Industry Level Analysis ................................................ 66 
Table 3. 4:Correlation Matrix (Industry-Level) ....................................................................... 67 
Table 3. 5: Determinants of cross-border listings: Analysis at the Firm-level ........................ 73 
Table 3. 6: Determinants of cross-border listings: Analysis at the Industry-level................... 76 
Table 3. 7: Determinants of cross-border listings: GMM Analysis at the Firm-level ............. 80 
Table 3. 8: Determinants of cross-border listings: GMM Analysis at the Industry-level........ 82 




Table B. 2: Variable definitions and sources ........................................................................... 86 
Table B. 3: List of Sample Countries and Number of Firms ................................................... 87 
Table 4. 1: Country-wise Descriptive Statistics ....................................................................... 99 
























List of Figures 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Quantile on Quantile Estimation for Local EPU and Cross-Listing ................... 109 
Figure 4.2: Quantile on Quantile Estimation for Global EPU and Cross-Listing ................. 111 
Figure 4.3: Wavelet Coherence Analysis for Local EPU versus Cross-Listing .................... 118 








































LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
EPU  Economic Policy Uncertainty 
OECD  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
US  United States of America 
CPI  Corruption Perception Index 
UK  United Kingdom 
QQR  Quantile on Quantile Regression 
WC  Wavelet Coherence 
OLS  Ordinary Least Square  
ADF  Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
BNY  Bank of New York 
GMM  Generalized Method of Moments 
NI  Net Income  
MB  Market to Book Value  
STAN  Structural Analysis 
NYSE  New York Stock Exchange 
SOA  Speed of Adjustment 
CL  Cross-listing 
WDI  World Development Indicator 
ADR  American Depository Receipt 
GDR  Global Depository Receipt 
ROA  Return on Assets 
ROCE  Return on Capital Employed 




SEC  Securities and Exchange Commission 
HAC  Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent 




CHAPTER ONE  
Introduction 
 
This chapter outlines the three main issues discussed in this thesis. It also provides the 
motivation and contributions of these discussions to the existing literature. Next, the chapter 
highlights the research outputs from the three essays. This chapter concludes by providing an 




The motivation to cross-list and the choice of the host market remains an important 
research question as global financial markets become increasingly integrated. Managers often 
report that cross-listing offers investors the possibility of foreign investment while providing 
significant positive market outcomes for firms ( e.g., Fanto and Karmel, 1997 and Karolyi, 
1998).  A large body of literature examines these positive market outcomes. They show that 
cross-listed firms exhibit evidence of increased analyst coverage, better information 
environment, improved liquidity, better corporate governance, and improved revenue 
compared to their locally listed counterparts1. While there is limited evidence on the 
permanence of some of these outcomes, these outcomes suggest that the motivation to cross-
list and the choice of the host market go beyond raising foreign capital ( e.g., Foerster, and 
Karolyi, 1999, and Karolyi, 2006 ).   
 
1 The literature provides detailed examination of these outcomes  (e.g.,  Bacidore, and Sofianos, 2002, Berkman 
and Nguyen, 2010, Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver, 2002, Bris, Cantale, Hrnjic, and Nishiotis, 2012, Pagano, Röell, 




The extant cross-listing literature discusses what motivates the cross-listing decision 
and the choice of the host market. A large number of studies show that market characteristics 
in both the local and host markets interact with firm features to motivate the cross-listing 
decision and the choice of the host market. However, there is limited consensus on the direction 
of the impact of market characteristics. The literature proposes two main arguments. The first 
argument suggests that the decision to cross-list and the choice of the host market is motivated 
by poorly functioning local markets, with inadequate minority shareholder protection and 
inefficient regulatory systems ( e.g., Karolyi 2004, and Korczak and Korczak, 2013). This 
argument builds on the premise that cross-listing provides an option to list on host markets with 
more robust frameworks. These studies emphasize the significance of market characteristics in 
the decision to cross-list and provide evidence that firms might be seeking positive market 
outcomes associated with more robust markets. 
The second argument suggests that high-income economies with better macro policies 
and efficient legal systems engage in more cross-listing compared to developing economies. 
This proposition is argued from an investor perspective. It shows that investors in the host 
market are likely to patronize firms from markets with good fundamentals ( e.g., Claessens, 
Klingebiel, and Schmukler, 2006). This line of argument suggests that firms from markets with 
sound fundamentals cross-list to meet the demands of investors.  While these two strands of 
arguments focus on market development and may not provide consensual conclusions on how 
market fundamentals drive cross-listing decisions, they point to the relevance of market 
characteristics in the decision to cross-list and the choice of the host market. 
Prior studies suggest that government policies define market characteristics and tend to 
have a substantial impact on corporate decisions and strategies. However, recent studies argue 
that uncertainties about government policies have a similar effect, given that government 




national policy debates, especially during the US election, the BREXIT referendum, tax reform 
debates in the UK, US-China trade disagreements, among others. The literature further 
indicates that such events contribute significantly to high uncertainty. Such uncertainties have 
significant implications for corporate decisions and operations. For example, they show that 
periods of high policy uncertainty discourage corporate investments and mergers and 
acquisitions (e.g., Kang, Lee, and Ratti, 2014, Bonaime, Gulen, and Ion 2018, and Gulen and 
Ion, 2015). Despite this evidence, these studies focus on corporate investments and mergers 
and acquisitions with cross-listing getting less attention. Unlike other organizational strategies 
and financing decisions, cross-listings are predominantly motivated by market characteristics, 
making policy uncertainty in both the local and host markets relevant to the decision to cross-
list and the choice of the host market. 
   Recent revelations suggest that the existing empirical evidence is insufficient in 
addressing the motives for cross-listing and their subsequent impact on corporate decisions and 
strategies. First, there is evidence of an increase in the number of firms cross-listing without 
raising foreign capital2. Second, there is evidence of significant growth in cross-listings to 
specific host markets, which might suggest the existence of peculiar market benefits despite 
global market integration3.   
Given this evidence, the three essays presented in this thesis provide an examination of 
two critical issues. First, the thesis examines how cross-listing affects corporate decisions and 
strategies. Second, it investigates whether dynamics in market characteristics from both 
macroeconomic and policy perspectives influence cross-listing decisions.  
 
2 See for example, Licht (2003), and Sarkissian and Schill (2016) 
3 Recent discussions by Abdallah and Abdallah (2019), Dodd (2013), and Sarkissian and Schill (2016) report an 





  The first essay, presented in chapter 2, investigates how and to what extent commitment 
to full disclosure and improved transparency due to cross-listing impacts the dividend 
smoothing strategies of foreign firms. For foreign firms, cross-listing in the US may signal a 
commitment to full disclosure and transparency, in line with the bonding hypothesis. The 
bonding hypothesis proposes that firms from countries with weak governance fundamentals 
cross-list to markets with robust governance mechanisms to signal their commitment to full 
disclosure and strict regulatory requirements (Coffee, 1999, 2002, and Stulz, 1999). 
Accordingly, a well-documented permanent outcome of cross-listing is improved information 
environment, minority shareholder protection, and transparency, especially when firms cross-
list in developed markets (e.g., Esqueda, 2016, Li, Brockman, and Zurbruegg, 2015, and Licht, 
2003). The extant cross-listing literature explains that compared to developing markets, 
developed markets tend to have more stringent disclosure and regulatory requirements. 
Consequently, listing on such markets signals managers’ willingness to disclose more 
information and subject themselves to more strict supervision, thus, becoming more 
transparent.  
 Since the seminal studies by La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000), 
an extensive literature associates dividend strategies with corporate transparency (Adjaoud and 
Ben‐Amar, 2010, Hong Kong and Mainland, Zhang, 2008, Lin, Chen, and Tsai, 2017, Price, 
Román, and Rountree, 2011, and Sharif and Lai, 2015). However, the question of whether 
improved transparency affects payout strategies has received limited attention. While recent 
studies examine how improved transparency due to cross-listing impacts dividend policy, there 
are no empirical studies on the impact of enhanced transparency on dividend smoothing 
strategies4. The first essay mitigates this gap by examining whether the commitment to full 
 
4 Petrasek (2012) and Esqueda (2016) provide some insight on how improvements in transparency affect 




disclosure and improved transparency due to cross-listing impacts dividend smoothing 
strategies. To this end, the study uses a consolidation of data from the Bank of New York 
Mellon, J.P. Morgan, and Citibank depository receipts websites of self-initiated cross-listings 
from 1995 to 2016. The study seeks to answer two critical questions. One, whether and to what 
extent cross-listing affects dividend smoothing practices of firms. Two, to identify the 
dynamics in the channels of dividend smoothing after cross-listing.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the role of market characteristics in the decision to cross-list and 
the choice of the host market. In particular, Chapter 3 is closely related to the strand of literature 
that argues a strong relationship between macroeconomic factors and cross-listing decisions. 
However, unlike previous studies, Chapter 3 investigates how specialization in output in both 
the local and host markets influences the decision to cross-list and the choice of the host market. 
The chapter builds on existing evidence that economies are specialized in output and proposes 
two arguments. First, specialization in output may suggest competition among firms that 
operate in that industry in all spheres, including competition for funds. Such competition is 
likely to drive firms to seek other sources of funding through listing on foreign markets, similar 
to the economics literature on internationalization (e.g., Mayer and Ottaviano, 2008 and 
Aiginger and Davies, 2004). Second, and in line with the international economics literature, 
we propose that firms may seek cross-listing in countries that are specialized in a given 
industry. This proposition follows the assertion of Pagano et al. (2002). They assert that firms 
are likely to cross-list in markets with a similar setup and positive market outcomes as their 
competitors to gain the same competitive edge as other competitors. The two propositions 
imply that firms may seek cross-listing to compete less for funding in the local market or to 
obtain additional benefits in specialized foreign markets.  
The essay in chapter 3 adopts a gravity model setup, which enables us to control for 




dependent variable, the share of cross-listing, is expressed as a ratio of the value of cross-
listings from a given local market listed in a given host market according to their respective 
industries. We initially undertake a firm-level analysis and then aggregate the data to perform 
an industry-level analysis to ascertain any industry-level trends. The industry-level analysis is 
motivated by the well-established phenomenon that some industries are generally attracted to 
specific markets (Bancel, Kalimipalli, and Mittoo, 2004).   
Chapter 4 discusses policy uncertainty and how it influences firm decisions and 
strategies. The chapter is motivated by the evidence that government policies define market 
characteristics. Several recent studies show the relevance of policy uncertainty for corporate 
decisions and strategies. Of particular note are those on economic policy uncertainty. Different 
from other forms of policy uncertainty, economic policy uncertainty is widely adopted as a 
proxy for the general economic confidence levels in a given country by several studies ( e.g., 
Antonakakis, Chatziantoniou, and Filis, 2014, Baker, Bloom, and Davis, 2016, Brogaard and 
Detzel, 2015, and Colombo, 2013).  Previous studies show that periods of high economic policy 
uncertainty have adverse effects on corporate operations and growth decisions. These include 
investments, capital structure and mergers, and acquisitions. Chapter 4 draws from this 
background to examine how local and global economic policy uncertainties influence corporate 
cross-listing decisions.  
The examination in Chapter 4 begins with finding a suitable measure of economic 
policy uncertainty. We resort to the monthly EPU index of Baker et al. (2016) for 13 countries 
for the period 1990 to 2016 to examine this relationship. Baker et al. (2016) construct a 
weighted average frequency count of news articles that contain words that connote uncertainty 
about a country for each month. We perform a Granger Causality test and then adopt a Quantile 
on Quantile Regression (QQR) approach, and a Wavelet Coherence (WC) approach to 




approaches help us to ascertain an in-depth relationship between cross-listing decisions and 
local and global EPU. 
 
1.2 Main Findings and Contributions to Existing Literature  
   
This section presents the main findings and research contributions of each of the essays 
presented in  Chapters 2, 3, and 4. 
Chapter 2 begins by discussing the association between transparency and dividend 
smoothing strategies. It asks the question of whether the commitment to full disclosure and 
improved transparency due to cross-listing impact corporate dividend smoothing.  Our sample 
consists of cross-listings in the US, given the well-reported transparency and disclosure 
outcomes in the literature (e.g., Boubakri, El Ghoul, Wang, Guedhami, and Kwok, 2016, Li, 
Brockman, and Zurbruegg, 2015, and Licht, 2003). We adopt Lintner’s partial adjustment 
model, which enables us to measure the speed of adjustment for the sample firms. We focus 
on the change in the speed of adjustment for the overall period and the period after cross-listing. 
This examination extends the existing knowledge in both the cross-listing and the corporate 
finance literature.  
We document an increase in dividend smoothing after cross-listing in the US. This 
finding relates to the signaling theory of dividend payment, which suggests that dividends 
communicate information about future earnings. Novel to the literature, we ascertain how the 
economic development of the local market impacts dividend smoothing strategies after cross-
listing. We report that firms from developing economies exhibit a 7.93% increase in payout 
smoothing after cross-listing compared to the 10.27% increase for firms from developed 
economies. Findings from the sectoral analysis show an increase in dividend smoothing of all 




Support Service activities industries. This finding follows the extant dividend smoothing 
literature that suggests significant sectoral variations in dividend smoothing strategies 
(Chemmanur, He, Hu, and Liu, 2010, Hoang and Hoxha, 2016, Javakhadze, Ferris, and Sen, 
2014, and Leary and Michaely, 2011) 
The variance decomposition approach to smoothing is widely used in both the finance 
and economics literature5. The adoption of this approach enables us to examine the channels 
of dividend smoothing at two levels; the aggregate and market levels. The findings show that 
cross-listed firms intensify the use of debts and investments in smoothing shocks to net income, 
keeping dividend smooth. We report that firms from developing countries absorb income 
shocks using the debt channel less effectively than investment.  
The contribution of chapter 2 is four-fold. First, it provides the first insight into how 
improvements in transparency due to cross-listing affect dividend smoothing strategies. 
Second, it shows how local market development mitigates or fosters dividend smoothing 
intensity. This contribution further adds to the existing literature on the relationship between 
investor sophistication and corporate decisions. Third, unlike previous studies that focus on 
dividend smoothing channels for different industries, the study offers new evidence on payout 
smoothing channels and their dynamics at the market level. Fourth, it shows the link between 
payout strategies and other financing decisions.   
The essay presented in Chapter 3 focuses on how specialization in output in the local 
and host markets interacts with the firm and other market characteristics to impact the bilateral 
cross-listing decision and the choice of the host market. The essay is related to the 
macroeconomic determinants of cross-listing, which show that market development and 
 
5 (see e.g., Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha, 1996, Balli, Basher, and Balli, 2013, Balli, Basher, and Louis, 2013, 




economic indicators are significant factors in the cross-listing decision6.  Despite the reasonable 
number of studies on the role of market characteristics, a vital market characteristic, 
specialization in output, is ignored (e.g., Bikker and Haaf 2002, and Aiginger and Davies 
2004).  
We adopt a gravity model that allows us to control for bilateral linkages between the 
source market and their host counterparts. The empirical findings suggest that specialization in 
output in both the local and host markets positively and significantly influences cross-listing 
decisions. Given the established sectoral variation in the choice of the host market, we provide 
both firm and industry-level examination of this relationship. While both analyses show similar 
results, we report that firms seek cross-listing in host markets that less specialized in the same 
industry as their local market. There is mostly a consensus on the positive impact of bilateral 
linkages in the bilateral asset flow literature. By contrast, we document a violation of the 
gravity/proximity arguments in the choice of the host market for cross-listing7.  
 Chapter 3 contributes to the literature by providing a robust examination of the 
association between market specialization in output and the cross-listing decision and choice 
of the host market. It also offers new evidence on the weakening of the gravity rules, as shown 
in recent studies (e.g., Hioki, Hewings, and Okamoto, 2005, and Melitz, 2007).  
Chapter 4 critically examines the impact of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) in the 
local and host market on the cross-listing decisions of firms. So far, existing studies show the 
negative effect of local EPU on corporate decisions, including investments and mergers and 
acquisitions, among others (e.g., Handley and Limao, 2015 and Gulen and Ion, 2015). Unlike 
previous studies, Chapter 4 provides an international perspective to this impact, while showing 
 
6 See for example Karolyi (2004) and Korczak and Korczak (2013) who provide detailed analysis on the subject. 





how local and global policy uncertainty impacts corporate decisions. Results from an initial 
estimation of the Granger Causality suggests causality between cross-listing and local and 
global EPU. However, the results are weak.  
We address this by implementing two contemporary approaches; a quantile on quantile 
approach and a wavelet coherence approach. These approaches help us to ascertain an in-depth 
relationship between cross-listing decisions and local and global EPU. Results from these 
approaches show that periods of high local economic policy uncertainty leads to increased 
cross-listing while periods of high global economic policy uncertainty discourages cross-
listing. These results are related to recent studies that document a negative impact of local EPU 
on firm expansionary decisions (e.g., Bonaime, Gulen, and Ion, 2018, Wang, Chen, and Huang, 
2014, and Zhang, Han, Pan, and Huang, 2015). However, the current study differentiates itself 
from recent studies by providing both a time-varying and market-related perspective. The 
findings suggest that smaller economies respond more to local EPU by intensifying cross-
listing during high EPU periods compared to their larger counterparts. Again the results show 
this relationship is time-variant and dynamic across different quantiles of both EPUs and cross-
listing decisions.   
  Chapter 4 makes essential contributions to the literature. It offers a thorough 
examination of how policy uncertainty impacts the decision to cross-list. The results provide 
new evidence on the influence of economic policy uncertainty on corporate decisions. 
However, different from previous studies, it offers an international perspective to the 
discussion, while adopting contemporary approaches. The findings suggest that the relationship 
between policy uncertainty and firm decisions is dynamic across different countries, time, and 
frequencies. The essay also highlights the relevance of market development in mitigating 
policy uncertainty shocks. The empirical results suggest that though policy uncertainty may be 




1.3 Research Outputs from the thesis 
 
1.3.1 Essay 1 
 
A revised version of the first essay from the thesis is under review with the Journal of 
Corporate Finance.  
 
1.3.2 Essay 2 
 
The second essay is under review with the Journal of International Money and Finance. It 
was presented in the following conferences: 
a.   The Auckland Finance Meeting, Queenstown, New Zealand in December 2017 under 
the title “Cross-listing decisions of firms and output specialization.” 
b. The New Zealand Association of Economists Conference, Victoria University of 
Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand, in June 2017 under the title “International cross-
listing and output orientation: evidence from OECD countries.” 
 
1.3.3 Essay 3 
 
The final essay is under review with the North American Journal of Economics and 
Finance. The essay was presented in the 32nd  Australiasian Banking and Finance conference 
held in Sydney, Australia, in December 2019 under the title “ Cross-listing flows under 







1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis contains three essays, which discuss the determinants of cross-listing 
decisions and the choice of the host market and the impact of cross-listing on subsequent 
corporate decisions and strategies. Chapter 2 presents the first essay, which examines the 
impact of improved transparency due to cross-listing on corporate smoothing strategies. Essay 
two is presented in Chapter 3 and investigates how specialization in output in the local and host 
markets influences the cross-listing under a gravity model setup. Essay three follows in Chapter 
4 and discusses how economic policy uncertainty in both the local and global markets affect 
cross-listing decisions of firms. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis and offers key findings and 
















Bonding Hypothesis: A dividend smoothing perspective 
 
                     
This study examines how and to what extent the commitment to full disclosure and 
improved transparency due to cross-listing impacts the dividend smoothing strategies of 
foreign firms. We report a 9.47% increase in the overall payout smoothing of foreign firms 
after cross-listing with significant dynamics in sectoral payout smoothing. We also document 
that firms from developing economies exhibit a 7.93% increase in payout smoothing after 
cross-listing compared to the 10.27% increase for firms from developed economies. Results 
from the variance decomposition approach show evidence of essential dynamics in the use of 
debt and investment channels after cross-listing at both market and industry levels.  Overall, 
our findings suggest that managers of cross-listed firms are motivated to ensure minimal 
fluctuations to dividend payouts due to the information content of dividend payment. Managers 





Dividend policies and their underlining determinants remain a puzzle in the finance 
literature. Existing studies inconclusively contend dividend payments citing its relevance or 
otherwise to firm value. For example, while Baker, Veit, and Powell (2001), and Auerbach and 
Hassett (2006) argue the importance of dividend payments to investors in firm valuation, Miller 
and Modigliani (1961) demonstrate the opposite. Despite this contention, firms continue to pay 
dividends and are sometimes reluctant to cut dividends, even at the expense of investment 
opportunities and increased debt ratios. Lintner (1956) presented the first empirical evidence 




adjustments aimed at achieving a target dividend payout. Several papers examine this 
phenomenon and provide supporting evidence8 and outline debts and investments as the main 
dividend smoothing channels (e.g., Lambrecht and Myers, 2012, Hoang and Hoxha, 2016, and 
Wu 2018). Of interest is the study by Leary and Michaely (2011), who examine the 
determinants of dividend payout smoothing of US firms. Leary and Michaely (LM) show that 
firms with low information asymmetry and high analyst coverage smooth dividend payouts 
more. Their paper explains that with low information asymmetry (high transparency) and 
analyst coverage, firms become more concerned about large volatilities in dividend payouts 
due to the information content of cash flow related news. Consequently, firms may smooth 
dividend payouts to minimize market reactions or expectations. If transparency and analyst 
coverage is key to high payout smoothing, should improvements in transparency via cross-
listing impact payout smoothing strategies of foreign firms?  
 
Cross-listing in the US may signal a commitment to full disclosure and transparency, 
in line with the bonding hypothesis, and suggests adherence to higher mandatory disclosure 
requirements for foreign firms ( e.g., Fanto and Karmel, 1997 and Coffee, 2002). For instance, 
cross-listing on Nasdaq, AMEX, or NYSE requires that firms become subject to stringent laws 
and supervision, including meeting higher disclosure and reporting requirements. Accordingly, 
US cross-listed firms exhibit increased transparency and disclosure compared to their locally 
listed peers after cross-listing (Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan, 1998, and Lang, Lins, and 
Miller, 2003). As foreign firms signal a commitment to full disclosure and become more 
transparent by listing in the US, we ask whether and to what extent such improvements impact 
their dividend smoothing strategies. 
 
 
8 For example, Chemmanur, He, Hu, and Liu (2010) compare the dividend payout smoothing of US and Hong 




While recent literature such as Petrasek (2012) and Esqueda (2016) show interest in 
how improved disclosure and transparency due to cross-listing impact dividends, there is little 
empirical research on the effect commitment to full disclosure and enhanced transparency have 
on dividend smoothing. Petrasek (2012) shows that firms increase cash payouts by about 9% 
of earnings after cross-listing on markets with higher disclosure and corporate governance 
requirements. He argues that this change is more significant for firms from countries with both 
weak shareholder protection and corporate governance mechanisms. However, the 
sustainability of such an increase remains a gap. We fill this gap. 
 
We posit in line with Petrasek (2012)’s argument and the bonding hypothesis that 
stringent laws and supervision in the US equity markets promote improved transparency. 
Besides, improved media coverage and analyst following might reflect in increased dividend 
payouts as firms might want to maintain investor attention through high dividends. On the other 
hand, increased access to funds could result in cross-listed firms being able to improve their 
profitability, leading to increased dividends. Notwithstanding these potential outcomes, we 
anticipate that these increases will not be permanent and is only sustainable until the host 
market familiarizes with the newly cross-listed firm9. We expect that the host market is likely 
to react to any further cash flow related news similar to the reaction for local firms, after this 
stage. We also expect that managers might adjust debt and investment to maintain stable 
dividends in line with budget constraints.    
 
The determinants of corporate dividend policy are numerous, dating back to those of 
Miller and Modigliani (1961). Several theories offer explanations to firms’ dividend policies. 
These include the signaling and agency cost theories (information content of dividend). For 
example, Lintner (1956) and Fama and Babiak (1968) show that managers smooth dividends 
 




to mitigate agency problems. To achieve this, firms target a long-term desired payout ratio and 
make episodic adjustments to dividends. Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000) find that firms 
facing more significant agency conflicts engage smooth dividends compared to firms that do 
not face similar levels of agency conflicts. Leary and Michaely (2011) document that age, size, 
earnings, and return volatility and analyst forecasts determine payout smoothing practices. 
They indicate that dividend smoothing is higher among firms that are exposed to agency 
conflicts. These studies, among others, summarize the arguments for the signaling and agency 
cost theories of dividend payouts. For foreign firms, cross-listing in the US may signal a 
commitment to full disclosure and transparency, which should significantly reduce agency 
conflicts. Another relatively similar explanation for dividend smoothing is the level of 
information asymmetry. For example, Guttman, Kadan,  and Kandel (2010) show that levels 
of informational asymmetry encourage (discourage) dividend smoothing, aimed at enabling 
investors to assess the real earnings ability and value of the firm. Leary and Michaely (2011) 
test this phenomenon and show that firms with low information asymmetry smooth payouts 
more. It is clear that the level of information asymmetry is relevant to the dividend smoothing 
discussion.  
The corporate finance literature shows that managers use other financing decisions to 
ensure smooth dividends. An extensive literature shows that managers tend to either increase 
borrowings, sacrifice investment, or a combination of both to ensure stable dividends (Myers 
and Majluf, 1984, and Brav et al., 2005). Myers and Majluf (1984) provide support for this 
assertion and show that to keep dividends stable, firms initially engage internal funds (sacrifice 
investment) and increase external borrowings. Campello, Giambona, Graham, and Harvey 
(2011) use a unique dataset to examine the reaction of firms to severe net income shocks and 
report that firms increase borrowing during periods of severe net income shocks and sacrifice 




to net income are absorbed using debt to keep dividends smooth. Hoang and Hoxha (2016) 
empirically test this phenomenon using a variance decomposition approach. They show that 
investment and debt together absorb about 97% of shocks to net income, while dividends reflect 
the remaining 3%. For cross-listed firms, we anticipate a potential change in their dividend 
smoothing strategies for two reasons. The market may view volatilities in dividend payout as 
earnings volatility and high risk. Two, absorbing shocks by increasing debt may be considered 
to be financial instability, while sacrificing investment may signal a lack of prospects 
 
Based on this background, we empirically test the dividend smoothing of foreign firms 
after cross-listing. Accordingly, we contribute to the dividend policy discussion in three ways. 
We examine how commitment to full disclosure and transparency due to cross-listing impacts 
the dividend smoothing of foreign firms. We then test whether this impact varies across 
different sectors and market developments. We also identify the channels of dividend 
smoothing at both aggregate and sectoral levels.  
 
We collect data on all cross-listed firms in the US equity markets from the Bank of New 
York Mellon, J.P. Morgan, and Citibank depository receipts websites. These depositories 
provide depository services to all American Depository Receipts (ADRs) for non-US firms. 
The dataset indicates the cross-listing dates and industry classification. In line with Javakhadze, 
Ferris, and Sen (2014), we only consider firms that have been cross-listed for at least five years 
before 2017 and pay dividends for at least five years. Our final sample consists of 893 firms.  
 
This study adopts Lintner’s partial adjustment model and a variance decomposition 
approach and shows a significant increase in dividend smoothing after cross-listing. In 
particular, we indicate intensified payout smoothing for firms from developed countries 
compared to those from developing countries. We also find sectoral variations in the extent of 




steam, and Air conditioning activities and Administrative and Support services showing 
evidence of reduced dividend smoothing after cross-listing.  
 
Results from the variance decomposition approach show three essential findings. We 
show that foreign firms intensify the use of debt and investment in smoothing shocks to net 
income, keeping dividends smooth. Consequently, we observe a 9% reduction in the 
unabsorbed net income shock after cross-listing compared to 14% before cross-listing.  We 
find that firms from developing countries absorb income shocks using the debt channel less 
effectively than investment.  We also observe significant differences in sectoral response to net 
income shocks after cross-listing. We report substantial decreases in the unabsorbed shocks to 
net income for all industries except for the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, Gas steam, and 
Air conditioning activities and Accommodation and Food Service activities industries.  
  
Overall, this study provides the first insight into the impact of cross-listing on 
developed markets on the dividend smoothing strategies of foreign firms. It shows the extent 
of dividend smoothing, highlight how managers increase debt and adjust investment to keep 
dividends stable in response to net income shocks.  
 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Recent discussions and related 
literature are presented in section 2. Section 3 describes the data, summary statistics. Section 4 
presents methodologies and estimation results, while Section 5 shows the conclusions and 








2.2   Related Literature  
2.2.1 Cross-listing and the Bonding Hypothesis 
 
Listing of shares in mature equity markets such as those in the US is generally 
associated with increased disclosure and transparency, bonding hypothesis. An extensive 
literature explains this as emanating from the relatively higher investor protection and 
disclosure requirements in the US ( Coffee, 1999, 2002, Stulz, 1999, Licht, 2003, and Li, 
Brockman, and Zuubruegg, 2015). These requirements entail making additional disclosures, 
resulting in foreign firms becoming more transparent. For example, the listing firm must first 
file an initial statement of registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It 
then must file Form-20-F in agreement with the Generally Accepted Accounting Principle 
(GAAP) or International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) reporting standards. Failure to 
conform to these set requirements may lead to penalties and potential delisting. Also, any 
documentation provided to investors in the listing firm’s local market must be submitted and 
reviewed by the SEC as part of Form 6-K.  Accordingly, US cross-listed firms exhibit increased 
transparency and reduced information asymmetry compared to their locally listed peers 
(Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan 1998 and Lang, Lins, and Miller 2003). Given this fact, the 
decision to cross-list in the US capital markets signals a firm’s commitment to full and higher 
disclosure requirements. Coffee (1999, 2002) terms this the bonding hypothesis in that firms 
from countries with weak minority shareholders protection and disclosure requirements may 
signal their commitment to higher scrutiny and regulation by cross-listing on markets with 
higher disclosure requirements. As foreign firms become more transparent, factors such as 
agency cost and information asymmetry tend to reduce10. It is also well-established that agency 
cost and information asymmetry influences corporate dividend policies. While the agency cost 
theory postulates that dividend payouts leave managers with limited free cash to misuse, the 
 
10 See Khurana, Martin, and Periera (2007), Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003), Li, Brockman, and Zurbruegg 




information asymmetry theory argues that they communicate insider impressions of a firm’s 
prospects. However, these theories, among others, do not entirely explain the dividend policy 
puzzle. 
 
2.2.2 Corporate Governance and Dividend Payout Policy 
 
Consistent with the agency cost hypothesis of dividend policy, dividends can signal 
corporate prospects (Bali 2003, Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll, 1969, Pettit, 1972, and Poterba 
and Summers, 1984). Based on the premise that capital markets are imperfect, there is 
information asymmetry between managers and other stakeholders. Hence, managers tend to 
possess information that is usually not publicly available and is mostly not reflected in firm 
valuation. Managers might use different dividends to communicate their insider knowledge to 
compensate for the information asymmetry between themselves and the market. This reasoning 
also supports the signalling theory of dividends, which specifies that the amount of dividend 
paid at a given period reflects managers’ superior insider information about the firm’s earnings 
prospects.  Accordingly, higher dividends may signal better earnings prospects, which can 
result in increased firm value. The signalling theory further asserts that since the market 
perceives dividends as indicative of managers’ insider information, share prices respond 
accordingly. For instance, an increase in dividends could result in a reactionary rise in share 
price11 while steady dividends, could result in stable share prices.  
 
Several studies examine how corporate governance influences dividend policy. For 
example, Adjaoud and Ben‐Amar (2010) consider the link between corporate governance 
quality and dividend payout policy of Canadian firms using their corporate governance scores. 
They show that firms with better corporate governance quality pay higher dividends while firm 
 




size and free cash flow levels are essential to dividend policy. Comparing cash dividends of 
Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong and Mainland China, Zhang (2008) indicates that in both 
cases, firms that have higher managerial members on the firm’s board tend to pay lower 
dividends. He concludes that better corporate governance requirements compel Hong Kong-
listed firms to pay higher dividends. Mitton (2004) samples 365 firms from 19 countries and 
argues that more robust corporate governance tends to result in higher dividends. He explains 
that high net income does not fully explain dividends. He also indicates that both firm-level 
and country-level corporate governance mechanisms complement each other in determining 
the dividends. Together these studies highlight the relevance of both firm- and country-level 
corporate governance mechanisms in determining the dividend policy of corporations.   
 
2.2.3 Corporate Governance and Dividend Smoothing 
 
The dividend smoothing discussions are rooted in the study of Lintner (1956), who 
provided evidence that firms smooth dividend relative to earnings. There is still, however, little 
agreement on the precise determinants of dividend smoothing.  For example, while Kumar 
(1988) indicates that dividend smoothing increases as firms’ cash flow volatility increases, 
Guttman et al. (2010) suggest that firms with higher investment opportunities at shorter 
horizons tend to smooth dividends compared to other firms. Leary and Michaely (2011) 
indicate that dividend payout smoothing is more prevalent for younger, more opaque firms, 
and firms with fewer tangible assets as they stand to benefit from signalling earnings prospects. 
Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) postulate that firms for which external finance is costly are 
likely to smooth dividends, even following a spike in earnings. They further indicate that this 
is mainly true for firms with high precautionary savings motives. Brennan and Thakor (1990) 
show that firms with more individual investors smooth dividends compared to those with 





An alternative explanation for dividend smoothing is the agency-based models. The 
model argues that dividend smoothing controls the agency cost of free cash flow. For example, 
Allen et al. (2000) show that managers smooth dividends to prevent substantial penalties that 
institutional investors could impose on them in response to enormous and frequent cuts in 
dividends. A pioneering study by Easterbrook (1984) specifies that high and smooth dividend 
reduces the funds available to managers, forcing them to raise funds externally. Thus, exposing 
managers to the discipline of external financial markets and reducing the agency cost. These 
studies hinge on the fact that dividends will need to be high and smooth enough to achieve a 
meaningful reduction in agency costs. Both the information asymmetry and agency cost 
explanations for dividend smoothing suggest that shareholders and the financial market have 
different levels of information about the real earnings ability of firms. 
  
 
The association between corporate disclosure/transparency and dividend smoothing is 
well-documented in the finance literature. For example, Gugler (2003) examines the 
relationship between ownership and control structure of firms and their dividend policy. He 
indicates that state-owned firms smooth payouts while family-owned firms do not. However, 
he shows that while state-owned organizations smooth dividends, family-owned firms pay 
minimum dividends. Hamed Al-Yahyaee, Pham, and Walter (2010) study the dividend payout 
policy of firms from developed and developing economies and show that although firms from 
developing economies pay smooth dividends, those from developed economies pay smoother 
dividends. Jeong (2013) investigates the dividend smoothing strategies of Korean firms and 
finds that while Korean corporations smooth dividends, US firms pay smoother dividends. He 
further explains that firm characteristics and macroeconomic factors such as interest rates and 
taxes influence dividend smoothing. An important note is a detail that better corporate 




improvement in corporate governance and disclosure of US cross-listed firms, it is crucial to 
understand how such enhancements affect their dividend policies.  
 
2.2.4 Channels of Dividend Payout smoothing  
 
The corporate finance literature shows that managers use other financing decisions to 
keep dividend payments stable. An extensive literature shows that managers increase 
(decrease) debt, decrease (increase) investment, or a combination of both to ensure steady 
dividends (Myers and Majluf, 1984, and Brav et al. 2005). Myers and Majluf (1984) provide 
support for this assertion and show that firms initially engage internal funds and increase 
external borrowings to keep dividends stable. Aivazian et al. (2006) examine corporate payout 
policies and report the use of both debt and investment channels to steady dividends. They 
show that firms with access to external funding are more likely to pay stable dividends due to 
access to external financing. They further show that this is not the case for firms with limited 
external funding. Campello, Giambona, Graham, and Harvey (2011) use a unique dataset to 
examine the reaction of firms to severe net income shocks and report that firms increase 
borrowing during periods of severe net income shocks and sacrifice investments. Campello, 
Graham, and Harvey (2010) survey 1,050 Chief Finance Officers (CFOs) and find that 
managers increase borrowings and, at the same time, sacrifice investments when net income is 
severely impacted, keeping dividends reasonably stable. Lambrecht and Myers (2012) builds 
on existing literature and propose that for a specific investment strategy, shocks to net income 
are absorbed using debt to keep payouts smooth. Hoang and Hoxha (2016) empirically test this 
phenomenon using a variance decomposition approach. They show that investment and debt 





As discussed earlier, the cross-listing literature argues significant increases in the 
information environment, disclosure and transparency, and analyst coverage after cross-listing. 
Aggarwal and Kyaw (2009), Krishnamurti, Šević, and Šević (2005), Zhou, Zhou, Peng, Chen, 
and Li (2018) show that increased transparency reduces both agency conflicts and information 
asymmetry. They further explain that shareholders, investors, and other stakeholders become 
increasingly aware of both financial and operational information as firms become more 
transparent, mitigating any pre-existing agency conflicts or information asymmetry. Given the 
literature on how agency costs and information asymmetry influence dividend smoothing, we 
ask the question of whether committing to full disclosure and becoming more transparent 
through cross-listing affects the dividend smoothing of foreign firms12.  
For cross-listed firms, we expect a change in their dividend smoothing strategies for 
two reasons. First, volatility in dividends may be considered by the market as earnings volatility 
and hence might be interpreted as high risk. Second, absorbing shocks by increasing debt may 
be viewed as financial instability, while sacrificing investment may signal a lack or inadequate 
prospects.  
We contribute to the literature by investigating how commitment to full disclosure and 
improved transparency through cross-listing impacts dividend smoothing after cross-listing. 
To this end, we adopt Lintner’s partial adjustment model and a variance decomposition 






12 See for example Lang, Lin, amd Miller (2003), Licht (2003), Doidge (2004), and Sarkissian and Schill (2016) 




2.3 Data and Summary Statistics 
 
We collect data on firms cross-listed in the US using a consolidation of data from the 
Bank of New York Mellon, J.P. Morgan, and Citibank depository receipts websites. These 
depositories provide depository services to all American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and 
Global Depository Receipts (GDRs) for non-US firms. The data from all the three depository 
websites identify depository receipts, listing date, home market, and their industry 
classification, providing a comprehensive dataset for this study. Given that the ADR program 
is mainly to facilitate US cross-listing, we only consider ADRs. ADRs allow US investors to 
buy shares of foreign firms while avoiding cross-country transaction fees and currency 
exchange fluctuations. Following Javakhadze et al. (2014), we require firms to have cross-
listed for at least five years before 2017 and have pay dividends for at least five consecutive 
years to be included in our sample. We also require firms to have data on earnings, debt, and 
investments before and after cross-listing to be considered in the final sample.  The resulting 
data set consists of 20,539 firm-year observations on 893 cross-listed firms from the period 
1995 to 2017, guided purely by data availability and meeting all set criteria.   
Noting that firm and country characteristics13 influence dividend payments, we collect 
data on firm characteristics, including net income, dividend payout per share, market to book 
value, age, and the number of outstanding shares from the DataStream database. We also 
collect corporate governance indicators, including ownership control, and Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of the home country. We collect the Corruption Perception Index from the 
Transparency International website as a proxy for the general corporate governance framework 
and investor protection for each cross-listing firm’s home country14. We source Country-level 
GDP from the World Bank’s WDI database. 
 
13 See for example Chemmanur, He, Hu, and Liu (2010), Leary and Michaely (2011), and Jeong (2013) 






Table A.1 (in Appendix) shows the sample distribution, indicating the home country 
and the number of firms in the total sample employed in this study. We observe that the 
majority of our sample are from Japan and the UK, which are more developed markets and 
could potentially suggest higher cross-listing demand in developed markets. While this might 
be the case, it also indicates the existence of peculiar market benefits in the US that might not 
be available in other developed markets.  
 
Table A.2 (in Appendix) presents summary statistics for all variables. Net Income 
represents the net income scaled by the total number of outstanding shares, MB is the market 
to book value per share, Payout is total payout (cash dividends and share repurchase) per share. 
Size is the log of total assets per share. Age is the number of years a firm has been cross-listed. 
Ownership is a dummy for whether a firm has a few shareholders (less than 5%) owning 
majority shares (more than 50%) or not and proxies shareholders’ control. GDP is the natural 
logarithm of the home country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and proxies market 
development. CPI is the Corruption Perception Index that represents the institutional quality 
and country-level corporate governance in the home country.  The Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) is a widely cited data source hosted and published annually by Transparency 
International. Individual countries are scored from 0 to 1015, with the highest score indicating 
the lowest corruption levels.  Debt represents total debt (short and long-term debts) scaled by 
the total number of outstanding shares, and Investment is the yearly dollar amount of cash 
balance scaled by the total outstanding shares. Note that we only introduce Debt and Investment 
in our variance decomposition analysis. 
 
 
15 The CPI scores for countries were scored between 0 and 10 till the year 2012. From 2012, countries are scored 
between 0 and 100. We divide the given CPI scores from 2012 by ten to avoid measurement disparity and ensure 




From the summary statistics in Table A.2, we observe a relatively similar mean for Size 
and Net Income, which may suggest that larger firms tend to have higher net income. Age has 
a mean of 21.96, which indicates that most of our sample firms have been cross-listed for at 
least 21.96 years on average. Average, minimum, and maximum values for Net Income and 
Payout suggest substantial variation in earnings ability and dividend payouts of sample firms.  
A 5.22 average CPI and a standard deviation of 2.34 further indicates that the sample firms are 
from countries with reasonably good corporate governance mechanisms. However, a minimum 
of 0.40 also suggests the inclusion of firms from countries with inferior corporate governance 
mechanisms. GDP values indicate a similar narrative to those from CPI summary statistics. 




2.4.1 Baseline Model 
 
We begin our analysis by estimating a dividend smoothing measure adopting Lintner's 
partial adjustment payout model.  Lintner (1956) shows that managers smooth dividends, 
making periodic modifications to dividends. A widely accepted measure16 of dividend 
smoothing is the Speed of Adjustment (SOA) coefficient, estimated using the equation: 
 
 ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 =  α + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡                                                                          (1)                               
                                                
where ∆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is the change in dividends of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡. 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 is the dividend payout in the 
previous year while 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the earnings of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡. Speed of Adjustment (SOA) is 
estimated as  𝛽1 from equation (1). SOA measures the change in dividend payout in response 
 




to a change in earnings. Following Javakhadze et al. (2014), earnings are the earnings in year 
𝑡 scaled by the total number of outstanding shares. 
From equation (1) we compute the speed of adjustment (SOA), 𝛽1, for each firm for the 
overall period and after cross-listing as part of the initial examination. Dividend smoothing is 
inversely related to SOA and is expressed as −𝛽1 . Thus, increased OA reflects a decrease in 
dividend smoothing, while decreased SOA indicates increased dividend smoothing. 
 
2.4.2 Change in dividend smoothing after cross-listing 
 
Table 2.1 shows that SOA decreases by 9% after cross-listing, indicating that dividend 
smoothing increases by about 9% after cross-listing. We test the significance of the change in 
mean using the T-test and Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney tests of equality, which reports a 
statistically significant difference in SOA at a 1% significance level. The change in SOA 
suggests that while firms might engage in dividend smoothing before cross-listing, they are 
motivated to keep dividends smoother after cross-listing. Whereas we are unable to measure 
dividend smoothing practices before cross-listing due to data limitation, we report intensified 
dividend smoothing after cross-listing. 
 
Table 2. 1: SOA: Overall Period and the Period After Cross-Listing (Entire Sample) 
Periods Mean SOA 
Overall   
45.97% 
(0.49)  











Notes: Table 2.1 shows the mean Speed of Adjustment (SOA) for the overall period and the period after cross-
listing. It also reports the change in mean SOA for the overall-period and the after cross-listing-period. Mean SOA 
values are reported in percentages. Standard Deviation values are presented in parenthesis.  *** indicates 





Given the well-established difference in dividend policy based on home market 
characteristics, we test how firms from developed and developing markets react to improved 
transparency. We resort to the country’s level of economic development17 classification by the 
United Nations (UNCTAD, 2018). The UNCTAD classifies countries into three development 
categories (developed, transitional, and developing). For simplicity, we combine transitional 
and developing, resulting in two broad categories, developed and developing. We estimate the 
mean SOA for firms from developed and developing markets and report the results in Table 
2.2. We observe increased dividend smoothing for firms from developed and developing 
economies. However, firms from developed economies pursue smoother dividends compared 
to those from developing markets. The finding could be explained by investor sophistication 
and market reaction in the home market. As posited by Silva and Chávez (2008), among other 
studies, investors in developing markets are more sensitive to dividend related news due to 
limited liquidity and higher transaction costs. For developed markets, investors are likely to 











17 See for example, Mitton (2004), Zhang (2008), and Javakhadze et al. (2014) who show that country level 




Table 2. 2: Difference between Developed and Developing Economies’ change in Speed 
of Adjustment (SOA) After Cross-Listing 










































Notes: Table 2.2 shows the mean Speed of Adjustment (SOA) for the overall period and the period after cross-
listing. It also the change in mean SOA for the overall period and the period after cross-listing for firms from 
developed and developing economies. Mean SOA values are reported in percentages, while ∆SOA presents the 
change in SOA after cross-listing. Standard Deviation values are presented in parenthesis.  *** indicates 
significance at 1% level.  
 
 
Previous studies report that firms from different industries have different cash flow 
needs. While some industries are cash flow dependent and require external financing, others 
have minimum cash flow needs and can raise funds internally. A firm’s dependence on internal 
or external sources of funding might be important to its subsequent dividend policy. Again, the 
level of industry competition can influence dividend smoothing behavior. For example, 
Javakhadze et al. (2014) indicate that firms from very competitive industries are motivated to 
keep dividends stable to attract investment capital. Also, firms from mature and high-profit 
industries might increase investments to smooth dividends, while those from cash-intensive 
industries might increase borrowing to keep dividends stable (Miao, 2005, and Kayo and 
Kimura, 2011). Using the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB, Rev 4), we categorize our 
sample into 11 industries in Table 2.3. From Table 2.3, we observe that most industries show 
an average increase in dividend smoothing of about 8% after cross-listing. However, we also 




Electricity, Gas, Steam and air conditioning activities, and Administrative and support service 
activities industries. Together these industries show an average reduction in dividend payout 
smoothing of about 6% after cross-listing. We posit, similar to Hoang and Hoxha (2016) that 
the cash requirements, level of competition, industry growth, and ability to raise funds could 
explain these differences. 
 
 
































































































Notes: Table 2.3 shows the mean Speed of Adjustment (SOA) for the overall period and the period after cross-
listing for 11 industries. It also shows the change in SOA for these 11 industries after cross-listing. Mean SOA 
values are reported in percentages while ∆SOA presents the change in SOA after cross-listing. *** indicates 






2.4.3 Determinants of payout smoothing (Overall and after cross-listing) 
 
Following the increased pursuit of dividend smoothing after cross-listing, we follow 
Leary and Michaely (2011) and investigate the factors that explain dividend smoothing after 
cross-listing.  
Correlation results for all variables are reported in Table A.3 (in the Appendix). We 
note that total payout is positively correlated with Size and CPI. Age and Ownership are 
negatively correlated with Payout, suggesting older firms and firms with low ownership control 
smooth dividends.  We observe a high correlation between firm size and age as older firms tend 
to have substantial assets. The maximum and minimum correlation coefficients provide 
evidence of the absence of multicollinearity issues among variables. 
 
We implement a cross-sectional Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent 
(HAC) regression using the estimated 𝛽1  from Equation (1), which follows the model: 
  
𝑆𝑂𝐴𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽6𝐶𝑃𝐼 +
𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝜀𝑖           (2) 
 
where  𝑆𝑂𝐴𝑖 represents the change in dividends from a shock in earnings. 𝑀𝐵 is the 
market to book value per share for each sample firm. 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if a firm has high ownership concentration. 𝐴𝑔𝑒 represents the number of 
years a firm has been cross-listed in the U.S. 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 is the total assets per share of the firm. 𝐶𝑃𝐼 
is the Corruption Perception Index score of the firm, which proxies country-level corporate 
governance. 𝐺𝐷𝑃 is the Gross Domestic Product of the home country of the firm. 𝜀𝑖 represents 






From Equation (2), we estimate two regressions for the overall period and the period 
after cross-listing and report our results in Table 2.4. Estimations results reported in columns 
(1) and (3) do not include country and industry fixed effects. Those reported in columns (2) 
and (4) control for both country and industry fixed effects. From Table 2.4, we observe that 
dividend payouts and firm age negatively and significantly impact SOA for the overall period 
with and without the fixed effects. Consistent with the univariate results of Leary and Michaely 
(2011), these results suggest that higher dividend smoothing is associated with different levels 
of dividends while controlling for the joint agency, performance, and information asymmetry 
measures. Although the age of firms is negative and significant during the overall period, it 
loses its significance after cross-listing. All other independent proxies remain statistically 

















Table 2. 4 Cross-sectional Estimation of the determinants of SOA 
 
Overall Period 
(1)      (1)                      (2) 
After Cross-listing 
(3)                                             (4) 
C 0.4006** 0.4768** 0.9140*** 0.9793*** 
 (2.019) (2.155) (3.390) (3.060) 
MB 0.0030 0.0038 -0.0248 -0.0239 
 (0.847) (0.865) (-1.513) (-1.193) 
Payout  -0.0004*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0005** 
 (-5.380) (-5.622) (-6.295) (-2.199) 
Ownership 0.0589 0.0567 0.0344 0.0278 
 (1.124) (1.048) (0.526) (0.407) 
Age -0.0071*** -0.0075** -0.0032 0.0000 
 (-2.696) (-2.550) (-0.437) (-0.004) 
Size 0.0352 0.0377 -0.0019 -0.0096 
 (1.404) (1.342) (-0.106) (-0.441) 
CPI -0.0789 -0.1102 -0.0210 0.0268 
 (-1.195) (-1.416) (-0.248) (0.258) 
GDP -0.0145 -0.0101 -0.0487 -0.0785 
 (-0.455) (-0.290) (-1.003) (-1.266) 
Fixed Effects No 
Yes No Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.021 
0.080 0.024 0.081 
Notes: Table 2.4 presents the cross-sectional estimation of the determinants of SOA for the overall sample period 
and the period after the US cross-listing. The independent variable, SOA, is the measure of dividend smoothing. 


















2.4.4 Decomposition of Net Income Smoothing Channels 
2.4.4.1 The variance decomposition approach 
 
We established that foreign firms pursue stable dividends after cross-listing. In this 
section, we examine the channels firms employ to achieve steady dividends.  From Equation 
(1), we use the intertemporal budget constraint developed by Lambrecht and Myers (2012) to 
test the response of dividends to net income shocks after cross-listing. Hoang and Hoxha (2016) 
forward two essential arguments in this respect. They argue that adverse shocks to net income 
may be absorbed using debt channels. However, positive net income shocks may be reflected 
in increased investments. Thus, shocks to net income may be absorbed by either or a blend of 
debt or investment channels. We, therefore, employ a foundational model for a firm's 
smoothing strategy considering its inter-temporal budget constraint in line with Lintner's model 
of dividend smoothing, further improved by Lambrecht and Myers (2012) in the form:  
 
∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖 + 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 =   𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖                                                (3) 
 
The model specifies that firms absorb the shocks in 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 by altering 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖 
through the settlement of current debt, increasing borrowings, and altering  𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 (cash 
balances)18. Lintner’s partial adjustment model suggests that managers set and follow a target 
dividend subject to the availability of investments and net income, aimed at minimizing 
frequent changes in dividend payments.  
 
Lintner developed his model based on an examination of a sample of big American 
firms, with dividend payments consisting of cash dividends solely. Lambrecht and Myers 
(2012) advanced this approach (as stipulated in Equation 2) with some reforms that included a 
comprehensive theory of payout, debt, and investment, following the intertemporal budget 
 




limitation and the dynamics of dividend smoothing19. For example, the payouts adopted in 
Lambrecht and Myers’s approach covered cash dividends as well as stock repurchases. The use 
of these two forms indicates total payout.  
 
Equation (3) indicates that when 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 fluctuates, and firms want to maintain 
minimum variation to dividends, the intertemporal budget restrictions might be brought back 
to balance by altering net debt (∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖), and/or by altering  𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖. For example, Hoang 
and Hoxha (2016) postulate that firms may increase their investment in response to shocks to 
net income that offer opportunities for growth and expansion. Else, firms may alter their debt 
ratio to absorb net income shocks, while keeping investment unchanged. Given this 
background, this study follows Lintner (1956), Brav et al. (2005), Lambrecht and Myers 
(2012), and assume that firms may want to keep payouts steady after cross-listing.  
 
Our model examines how the commitment to full disclosure and improved transparency 
from cross-listing in the US influence the dividend smoothing strategies of firms. We follow 
the variance decomposition model developed by Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha (1996), and 
Sørensen and Yosha (1998) to examine this relationship. This methodology is used mainly in 
the economics literature to measure income and consumption smoothing channels. For 
example, Balli and Balli (2011) investigate the likely welfare gains and channels of income 
smoothing. They adopt the variance decomposition approach to measure the degree of risk-
sharing and their channels thereof. Balli, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sørensen  (2012) also adopt this 
approach while studying risk-sharing through capital gains.  
 
 




This study follows Hoang and Hoxha (2016) while implementing the approach of 
Asdrubali et al. (1996), and Sørensen and Yosha (1998), and propose the ensuing expression 




𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 + ∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖
×
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 + ∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖
× 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖              (4) 
 
We conjecture that firms are likely to smooth changes in earnings through borrowings, 
which should be evident in the variation between 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 and 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 + ∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖. 
Another smoothing channel can be through a firm’s investment, evident in the difference 
between 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 + ∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖 and 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 (from Equation 3) when volatility in a firm’s 
earnings is not entirely smoothed using debt.  
 
By adopting the approach of Hoang and Hoxha (2016), we can ascertain the magnitude 
of changes in 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 absorbed by firms using debt and investment channels.  To achieve 
that, we apply a log transform and first difference to the factors in Equation (4) to provide a 
growth rate expression. We follow that by also multiplying both sides of the equation with 
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 to generate the cross-sectional variance decomposition equation expressed 
as:  
 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖:𝑣𝑎𝑟{∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖} = 𝑐𝑜𝑣{∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖, ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 −
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 + ∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖) } + 𝑐𝑜𝑣{∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖, (∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 +
∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖) − ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖)} +





We further scale both sides of Equation (5) with the variance of ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 that 
results in attaining the slope coefficients from three different panel univariate regressions with 
a total sum of 1. Thus, expressed mathematically as: 
 
 1 = 𝛽𝐷 + 𝛽𝐼 + 𝛽𝑃                                                                                                                             (6)              
                                                                  
where  𝛽𝐷 represents the slope coefficient in the regression of ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 −
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 + ∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖) on ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 and  proxy the debt channel; 𝛽𝐼 
represents the slope coefficient in the regression of ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 + ∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖) −
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 on ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 and also a proxy for the investment channel.   
𝛽𝑃    represent the slope coefficient, in the regression of ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 on ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 
and proxy the payout channel of smoothing of earnings. 
 
Using the following panel regressions, we produce the estimation coefficients for 
Equation (7) as: 
 
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡) =  𝛽𝐷∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
𝜖𝑖𝑡𝐷                                                                                                                                                          (7a)  
 ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡) − ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝐼∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡𝐼          (7b) 
∆ log 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑃∆ log 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡𝑃                                                                           (7c)            
         
where 𝑖 is the firm characteristics at time 𝑡 while 𝑡 is the year of observation for the three-panel 
regressions given above. With this, we can interpret an assumed 100% increase in the growth 





Equation (7a) argues that if firms smooth variations by returning debt, the growth rate 
of ∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 is 100%, which further shows the term 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 grows at a rate of 
zero. A coefficient, 𝛽𝐷 = 1 is generated from the regression of  ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 −
∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡) on ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 if changes in net income are entirely 
compensated for by debt repayment. If a 100% increase in  𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 increases by 100% 
result in no smoothing in borrowing, 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡 is adjusted to grow at a rate 
same as that of 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡. Thus, regressing ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡) on ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 results in 𝛽𝐷 being equal to zero.  On the other hand, if 
changes in net income are not entirely compensated for with debt totally, we expect that these 
changes are compensated for by adjusting investments. These adjustments to investments are 
justified by the same reasons given for alterations in debt/borrowing. From  Equation (7b), the 
dependent variable, ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡) − ∆𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡, represent investments 
with a coefficient, 𝛽𝐼, proxying the magnitude of changes to earnings that are absorbed by 
adjusting investments. 
 
From Equation (7c), the coefficient 𝛽𝑃 represents the percentage of change in earnings 
that are not compensated for by adjusting debt and investment channels. From a theoretical 
perspective, dividends should remain smooth as changes in net income are compensated for 
with adjustments to debt and investments. Thus, dividend payouts are regarded as smoothed 
when 𝛽𝑃 approaches zero.  A case of a perfect dividend smoothing would imply that 𝛽𝑃 is zero 
(i.e., 𝛽𝑃 = 0). Given that investment and debt financing both smooth shocks to net income, the 
unabsorbed shock is reflected in the coefficient of 𝛽𝑃. Although the literature on the subject is 
limited, Hoang and Hoxha (2016) show evidence that firms use debt and investment to smooth 
shocks in net income, ensuring little to no variability in dividends. In the case of cross-listed 
firms, it becomes more financially stressful to maintain this approach in both the home and 




with results presented in Table 2.5. In an ideal case, all betas should add up to exactly 100% or 
1. However, our sample suffers from heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, which results in 
cross-sectional estimation betas that do not add up to exactly 100% or 1. This does not affect 
the substance of our analysis. 
 
2.4.4.2 Benchmark Results 
 
To examine whether cross-listed firms use debt and investment to keep dividends 
smooth, we employ firm-level data. Table 2.5 presents the benchmark results for the overall 
period, pre-cross-listing, and post-cross-listing periods. The unsmoothed coefficient (𝛽𝑃)  for 
the overall period yields 12% and statistically significant. More importantly, we show 
substantial differences in dividend smoothing before and after the cross-listing.  Specifically, 
we observe that the unsmoothed shocks to net income reduce from 14% to 6% after cross-list 
in the US. In line with our initial findings, the negative trend in  𝛽𝑃 suggests that firms seek to 
appear financially stable by providing a dividend policy less dependent on net income 
fluctuations.   
 
To achieve this aim, cross-listed firms use different channels to absorb net income 
shocks. Rows (1) and (2) of Table 2.5 show the magnitude of income shocks absorbed using 
debt and investment. We find that before cross-listing, 62% of fluctuations in earnings are 
absorbed through debt, while 25% are absorbed through investment. Our results add to the 
discussions that debt and investments are the primary channels in smoothing fluctuations in 
earnings. These figures are not very far away from those from Hoang and Hoxha's, where they 
find that debt and investment absorb 56.85% and 40.72% of the shocks to net income (Hoang 
and Hoxha, 2016). However, consistent with our findings, we show a positive change in 
estimated coefficients. We report that net income smoothing via debt increases from 62% to 





We, therefore, argue that firms adjust their dividend payouts and provide reasonably 
smoother dividends after cross-listing. We also show that firms achieve this by increasing 
(decreasing) debts and decreasing (increasing) investment channels to absorb fluctuations in 
net income. We again postulate that positive shocks to net income are smoothed by increasing 
investments, while negative shocks are smooth by decreasing the amount of investments. This 
is evident in the increase in investment channels (from 25% to 31%) after cross-listing. Thus, 
one might argue that after cross-listing, firms absorb more shocks to net income using the 
investment channels compared to debt channels, given the 6% increase in investment channels 
compared to the 4% increase in debt channels. These adjustments to debt and investment 
channels are further shown in the amount of unabsorbed shocks to net income (𝛽𝑃), where the 
unabsorbed shock to net income decreases by 8% (from 14% to 6%) after cross-listing. The 
decrease suggests, in line with our initial results, that cross-listed firms smooth dividends after 
















Table 2. 5: The decomposition of the Net Income Smoothing via Different Channels ( 
Entire Sample). 
























Notes: The table shows shocks to net income absorbed by alterations to debts and investments. Payout (𝛽𝑃) 
represents the magnitude of the shock to net income unabsorbed. 𝛽𝐷 is the slope coefficient from Equation (7a), 
𝛽𝐼is the slope coefficient from Equation (7b). 𝛽𝑃 is the slope coefficient from Equation (7c). The coefficients are 
multiplied by 100. ***, **, and * show a 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively, while values in 
parenthesis are standard errors. 
 
 
2.4.4.1 Channels of smoothing for firms from developed and developing markets 
 
Similar to the results in Table 2.2, several studies show different dividend smoothing 
magnitudes across different markets ( e.g., Jeong 2013). Consequently, shocks to net income 
may be smoothed with more debts or investment, depending on the home market’s 
development. This section explores how dividend smoothing differs conditional on the home 
market’s development. We differentiate developed and developing markets using the home 
market’s development based on the United Nation’s classification (UNCTAD, 2018). The 




developing). For simplicity, we combine transitional and developing, resulting in two broad 
categories (developed and developing). From Table 2.6 and 2.7, we find that before cross-
listing, firms from developed countries smooth 62% of shocks to income using debt while those 
from developing countries smooth 86% of net income shocks using debt. We also find that 
after cross-listing, firms from developed economies intensify the use of debt channels from 
62% to 73%. Firms from developing economies absorb less (from 86% to 74%) shocks to net 
income using debt channels. A potential explanation could be the pre-existing high use of debt 
to smooth net income shocks before cross-listing. This finding is also in line with the positive 
association between developing capital markets, weak corporate governance mechanisms, and 
high debt ratios in emerging markets (Aivazian, Booth, and Cleary, 2001, and Mitton, 2008). 
Aivazian et al. (2001) indicate that the lack of transparency and weak shareholder protection 
in emerging markets promote the signaling role of dividends. Consequently, firms from 
emerging countries are motivated to increase debt to signal prospects. After cross-listing, firms 
become more transparent, reducing debt accumulation, whether it is a good or bad year. After 
cross-listing, these firms tend to use more investments to smooth net income shocks to be 
regarded as financially stable by investors.  
 
On the investment front, we observe a reduction in the use of investment channels (from 
30% to 22%) for firms from developed markets while we observe an increase (from 0% to 
21%) for firms from developing countries. More importantly, we find that while firms from 
developed countries make a 5% adjustment to dividend payouts after cross-listing, those from 
developing markets make a 7% change. Thus, our results suggest that firms from emerging 
countries tend to use investments channel- increase investment in good years, decrease 





Coefficients of the unabsorbed shocks to net income (𝛽𝑃) show a more drastic reduction 
(from 16% to 7%) for firms from emerging economies after cross-listing.  Firms from 
developed economies show a less drastic decrease (from 9% to 5%) in the amount of 
unabsorbed shock to net income compared to firms from developed markets. However, after 
cross-listing, firms from developed economies appear to have a lower (5%) unabsorbed shock 
to net income compared to the 7% for firms from emerging economies. It is apparent that cross-
listing in the U.S motivates dividend smoothing, as shown in the decrease in the amount of 





















Table 2. 6: The decomposition of the Net Income Smoothing via Different Channels 
(Developed and Developing Countries) 






Panel A: Developed 
Countries 
   


















Panel B: Developing 
Countries 
   


















 Notes: The table shows the shocks to net income absorbed by alterations to debts and investments. Payout (𝛽𝑃) 
represents the magnitude of the shock to net income unabsorbed. 𝛽𝐷 is the slope coefficient from Equation (7a), 
𝛽𝐼is the slope coefficient from Equation (7b). 𝛽𝑃 is the slope coefficient from Equation (7c). The coefficients are 
multiplied by 100. ***, **, and * show a 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, respectively, while values in 








2.5 Conclusion  
 
Dividends are generally considered a vital outlet to signal earnings expectations. 
Therefore, managers smooth dividend payouts via financing decisions, including debt and 
investment decisions. Several studies argue that information asymmetry determines dividend 
smoothing. Consistent with the bonding hypothesis, cross-listing signals a firm’s commitment 
to full disclosure and transparency: decreasing information asymmetry and agency cost. This 
paper examines how and to what extent commitment to full disclosure and transparency 
through cross-listing impacts the dividend smoothing strategies of firms and ascertain the 
channels of achieving stable dividends.  
 
The initial results are based on Lintner’s partial adjustment dividend model, where the 
speed of adjustment (SOA) is inversely related to dividend smoothing. Our findings show a 
9.47% increase in dividend smoothing after cross-listing. We report a higher increase in 
dividend smoothing for firms from developed economies at 10.27% compared to those from 
developing economies at 7.93%. Given the well-evidenced variation in cash requirements 
across different industries, we examine the dividend smoothing across various industries. We 
find that all other firms exhibit increased dividend smoothing after cross-listing except those 
from Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, Electricity and Gas, Administrative, and Support 
Service activities industries.  
 
Novel to the cross-listing literature, we decompose the net income smoothing channels 
in line with Lambrecht and Myers (2012). Our results show an increase in the use of both debt 
and investment channels to smooth shocks to net income. We also examine the difference in 
the net income smoothing by the home country’s development status. We show that while firms 
from developing economies tend to sacrifice more investments to smooth net income shocks, 





Overall, our results highlight that commitment to full disclosure and improved 
transparency further exposes firms to market forces. Such exposure motivates managers to keep 
dividends stable due to the information content of dividend payment. The findings in this paper 


























Table A. 1: Sample Distribution 
Country Number of Firms Percentage of Sample 
Argentina 8 0.90% 
Australia 45 5.04% 
Austria 11 1.23% 
Belgium 11 1.23% 
Brazil 21 2.35% 
Chile 6 0.67% 
China 14 1.57% 
Colombia 1 0.11% 
Czech Republic 1 0.11% 
Denmark 9 1.01% 
Egypt 1 0.11% 
Finland 16 1.79% 
France 33 3.70% 
Germany 41 4.59% 
Greece 6 0.67% 
Hong Kong 55 6.16% 
Hungary 2 0.22% 
India 28 3.14% 
Indonesia 16 1.79% 
Ireland 10 1.12% 
Israel 2 0.22% 
Italy 25 2.80% 
Japan 191 21.39% 
Korea 10 1.12% 
Lithuania 1 0.11% 
Luxembourg 1 0.11% 
Macau 1 0.11% 
Malaysia 7 0.78% 
Mexico 13 1.46% 
Morocco 1 0.11% 
Netherlands 15 1.68% 
New Zealand 8 0.90% 
Norway 9 1.01% 
Peru 1 0.11% 
Philippines 14 1.57% 
Poland 3 0.34% 
Portugal 6 0.67% 
Romania 1 0.11% 
Russia 5 0.56% 
S. Africa 20 2.24% 
Singapore 25 2.80% 




Sri Lanka 1 0.11% 
Sweden 18 2.02% 
Switzerland 19 2.13% 
Taiwan 18 2.02% 
Thailand 22 2.46% 
Turkey 14 1.57% 
UK 90 10.08% 
Venezuela 2 0.22% 
Total 893 100% 




Table A. 2: Summary Statistics 
Notes: Table A.2 presents the summary statistics for all variables. Firm characteristics include Net Income, MB, 
Payout, Size, Age, Ownership, Debt, and Investm. Country-level characteristics employed in this analysis include 





Median  Max.  Min  S.D  Skew.  Kurt. 
Net Income 14.08 13.96 23.82 0.13 2.69 0.22 3.10 
MB 3.06 0.65 20.27 -4.60 5.72 1.43 3.56 
Payout 0.61 0.34 16.00 0.01 12.47 1.50 3.45 
Size 13.41 14.70 21.82 4.60 5.14 -2.10 6.95 
Age 21.96 26.00 32.00 4.00 7.82 -0.80 2.46 
Ownership 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.46 -0.73 1.54 
GDP  3.56 3.56 4.84 2.42 0.56 0.01 2.35 
CPI 5.22 4.80 10.00 0.40 2.34 0.31 1.79 
Debt 12.28 12.54 19.53 0.06 2.58 -0.68 4.22 




Table A. 3: Pairwise Correlation between Main Variables 
Correlation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Net Income 1.00          
2. MB 0.18 1.00         
3. Payout -0.14 -0.03 1.00        
4. Size 0.09 -0.31 0.02 1.00       
5. Age 0.02 -0.05 -0.02 0.15 1.00      
6. Ownership -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 1.00     
7. GDP -0.12 -0.22 -0.01 -0.22 -0.01 0.02 1.00    
8. CPI 0.03 -0.05 0.01 -0.22 -0.04 0.03 0.34 1.00   
9. Debt 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 1.00  
10. Investment 0.02 0.00 0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.10 1.00 
Notes: Table A.3 presents the pairwise correlation coefficients for all variables employed in the multivariate analysis. Firm-level  
characteristics include Net Income, MB, Payout, Size, Age, Ownership, Debt, and Investm. Country-level features used in this  
























Table A. 4: Variable definition and source 
Variable  Definition Source 
  𝑆𝑂𝐴𝑖  Represents the speed of 
adjustment (SOA) 
Manually estimated by the author using Lintner’s partial 
adjustment model 
𝑀𝐵 Measures the market to book value 
per share for each sample firm 
Datastream  
𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 Measure ownership control and is 
a dummy for whether few 
shareholders (less than 5%) own 
majority shares (more than 50%). 
It proxies shareholders’ control 
Datastream 
𝐴𝑔𝑒 Represents the number of years a 
firm has been cross-listed in the 
U.S. 
Consolidation of Data from the Bank of New York 
Mellon, J.P. Morgan, and Citibank depository receipts 
websites 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 Measures the total assets per share 
of the firm 
Datastream 
𝐶𝑃𝐼 Represents the Corruption 
Perception Index score of the home 
country of each firm, which proxies 
country-level corporate 
governance 
Transparency International website: 
https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 Measures the Gross Domestic 
Product of the home country of the 
firm 
World Bank’s WDI database 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 Measures total debt and is the sum 
of short- and long-term debts per 
share 
Datastream 
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 Measures the cash balances per 
share 
Datastream 















Cross-listing Decisions and Specialization in Output 
 
 
This study investigates how specialization in the output of the local and the host market 
impacts the cross-listing decisions of firms. Implementing a gravity model on a sample of 1779 
firms, we find that market specialization is an essential consideration in the decision to cross-list 
and the choice of the host markets. Results from a firm and industry-level examination show that 
firms from local markets that specialize in specific industries engage in more cross-listing. We 
document that firms from such specialized local markets prefer to cross-list in less specialized host 
markets. We also report, especially at the firm-level, that firms seek funding diversification 
opportunities in the choice of the host market.  
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
A prominent outcome of globalization and economic integration is specialization in national 
output. Accordingly, countries have progressively become more specialized in specific industries 
(Bikker and Haaf, 2002, and Aiginger and Davies, 2004). Firms operating in such local markets 
tend to face higher competition in all areas, especially in funding due to the sheer number of firms 
competing for similar funds (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001, Wahal and Wang, 2011). Cross-
listing shares on foreign markets may provide firms from such markets the ability to raise foreign 
capital (Korczak and Korczak 2013).  Unlike other generic sources of funding, cross-listing offers 
additional market outcomes. These outcomes include increased analyst coverage (Baker, Nofsinger, 
and Weaver, 2002), improved information environment (Bris, Cantale, Hrnjić, and Nishiotis, 2012), 
improved liquidity (Bacidore and Sofianos 2002; Berkman and Nguyen 2010) better corporate 




increased foreign sales (Pagano, Röell, and Zechner, 2002, and Dodd 2013)20. The current study 
examines whether specialization in the output of the local and host markets influences the cross-
listing decision and the choice of the host market. 
 
An extensive literature investigates the determinants of cross-listing decisions and the 
choice of the host market. The evidence suggests that market characteristics in both the local and 
host markets interact with firm-level characteristics to motivate the cross-listing decision and the 
choice of the host market. However, there is limited consensus on the direction of the impact of 
market characteristics. The literature proposes two main arguments. The first argument suggests 
that the decision to cross-list and the choice of the host market is motivated by poorly functioning 
local markets, with inadequate minority shareholder protection and inefficient regulatory systems ( 
e.g., Karolyi, 2004, Korczak and Korczak, 2013). This argument builds on the premise that cross-
listing provides a means of listing on host markets with more robust markets. These studies highlight 
suggest the relevance of market characteristics in the cross-listing decision and provide evidence 
that firms might be seeking positive market outcomes associated with more robust markets. 
The second argument suggests that firms from higher-income economies with better macro 
policies, efficient legal systems, and more robust markets engage in more cross-listing compared to 
developing economies. This proposition is argued from an investor perspective. It shows that 
investors in the host market are likely to patronize firms from markets with sound fundamentals ( 
e.g., Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler, 2006). This line of argument suggests that firms from 
markets with sound fundamentals seek cross-listing in response to investor demands.  While these 
two strands of arguments focus on market development and may not provide consensual results on 
how market fundamentals drive cross-listing decisions, they point to the relevance of market 
characteristics in the decision to cross-list and the choice of the host market. 
 
 
20 Abdallah and Ioannidis (2010), Li et al. (2015), and Sarkissian and Schill (2016) report that these incentives are 




In addition to market development, the literature shows that proximity (Ahearne, Griever, 
and Warnock, 2004, Chan, Covrig, and Ng, 2005, and Dodd and Frijns, 2015) and firm and industry-
specific characteristics (Lang, Lin, and Miller, 2003b, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004, Abdallah 
and Ioannidis 2010) influence cross-listing decisions and the choice of the host market. However, 
two opposing pieces of evidence are presented. The first evidence shows that firms cross-list on 
markets that are geographically closer to their local market and have similar industrial setup as those 
in their local market. The other evidence suggests that firms seek cross-listing in markets that are 
further from the local market geographically and with a different industrial setup. Given this 
background, it becomes essential to understand how these dynamics interact with the specialization 
in the output of the local and host markets to determine the cross-listing decision and the choice of 
the host market. 
 
This paper proposes the following arguments. One, specialization in output suggests 
competition among firms that operate in that industry in all spheres, in particular competition for 
funds (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001, Wahal and Wang, 2011). Such competition is likely to 
drive firms to seek other sources of funding through listing on foreign markets (e.g., Mayer and 
Ottaviano, 2008, and Aiginger and Davies, 2004). Two, we propose that firms may seek cross-
listing in countries that are specialized in a given industry. This proposition follows the assertion of 
Pagano et al. (2002). They assert that firms are likely to cross-list in markets with similar positive 
market outcomes as their competitors to gain the same competitive edge. These two propositions 
suggest that firms may seek cross-listing in an attempt to compete less for funding or in an effort to 
gain additional benefits in a specialized foreign market. To our knowledge, no study has examined 
how specialization in output influences the cross-listing decision and the choice of the host market. 
This study fills this gap and provides insight into how local and host market characteristics interact 





We collect data on cross-listing decisions for the period 1995 to 2014, guided by data 
availability. We adopt a gravity model setup, which enables us to control for bilateral linkages 
between the local and host markets. The dependent variable, the share of cross-listing, is expressed 
as a ratio of cross-listings from a given local market listed in each host market according to their 
respective industries. We initially undertake a firm-level analysis and then aggregate the data to 
perform an industry-level analysis to ascertain any industry-level trends. The industry-level analysis 
is motivated by the well-established phenomenon that certain industries are commonly attracted to 
specific markets (Bancel, Kalimipalli, and Mittoo, 2004).   
 
Results from the firm-level analysis show that specialization in the output of the local market 
encourages cross-listing. This finding suggests that the cross-listing decision is motivated by a 
firm’s desire to seek diversification in funding sources and the unwillingness of managers to 
compete in the local market for funding. The results are also supportive of the literature that 
competition in the local market drives firms to seek new markets. We find a preference for host 
markets that are less specialized and further away from the local market.  Our findings suggest the 
weakening of the proximity bias, which were previously valid in explaining bilateral asset flows 
(Frenkel, Funke, and Stadtmann, 2004, Aviat and Coeurdacier, 2007, and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 
2008). Next, we examine this relationship at the industry level and find that specialization in output 
in the local market foster cross-listing. Again, we report a preference for host markets that are less 
specialized and further away from the local market, further indicating the weakening of the 
proximity bias.  
We then implement a Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) approach to assess the 
robustness of the results and report similar results as those from the initial analysis. The findings 
provide new evidence for the weakening of the gravity model conditions in line with recent studies. 
The results also suggest that while specialization in output may be a country-specific characteristic, 
cross-listing might present a spillover channel to alter specialization in output. Again, the findings 




The rest of this study proceeds as follows. The related literature is presented in section 2, 
while Section 3 presents data and descriptive statistics. Section 4 provides details of the 
methodology. Section 5 of the study discusses the estimation results from the analysis. The 




3.2 Related Literature 
 
In the face of globalization, international trade and asset flows have become fluent in recent 
years. Pioneering studies on international trade, asset flows, and output specialization, including 
Porter (1990), show that the removal of international trade and asset flow barriers exposed countries 
to higher competition in their production output from other countries. More recently, Aiginger and 
Davies (2004), studying the industrial specialization of European countries, shows that the 
integration of markets widens the consumption and competition horizons among world markets. As 
the competition between countries intensifies, Porter (1990) suggests that economies have focused 
the majority of their resources on industries where they have a competitive advantage, resulting in 
specialization in the output (Ricci, 1999).  
 
The finance literature shows that as countries become more specialized in their output, firms 
in these countries face stiffer competition in raising funds from the local market (Bikker and Haaf, 
2002). Further, this increased competition tends to cause investors to require higher returns for their 
investment as they have several similar investment options in those industries (Dodd, 2013). 
Consequently, over the last two decades, cross-listing has become an increasingly vital strategy for 
firms. Coupled with the operations of firms becoming global, the ability to directly raise foreign 
capital through foreign listing is of great importance to firms (Aiginger and Davies, 2004). 




cross-list. However, recounting the motivation for cross-listing, previous studies show that firms 
seek foreign listing for two broad reasons; increased access to funds and positive market outcomes. 
The marker outcomes include increased analyst coverage (Baker et al. 2002), improved information 
environment (Bris et al. 2012), improved liquidity (Bacidore and Sofianos, 2002, and Berkman and 
Nguyen, 2010) better corporate governance (King and Segal, 2003, Karolyi, 2012, and Li et al. 
2015) and business strategy (Pagano et al. 2002, and Dodd, 2013). Previous studies have shown 
that these outcomes are enabled in markets with specific characteristics, making it essential to 
understand how market characteristics impact the cross-listing host choices of firms  (Pagano, 
Randl, Röell, and Zechner, 2001).  
 
From an international economics perspective, since the new evidence on the host market 
choices of firms by Krugman (1991), several studies have examined firms’ choice of host markets. 
For example, Cheng (2007) examines the location choices of firms in China using a nested logit 
model. He shows that regional potentials motivate the location choices of firms. Devereux, Griffith, 
and Simpson (2007) report that firms are interested in agglomeration effects, while government 
grant policies have a low impact on the choice of the host market of firms. Studies in this regard 
extend from the operational host market choices of firms to the foreign listing choices of firms.  
 
 
Studies on cross-listing patterns have shown considerable cross-listing dynamics on the 
traditional host markets over the past recent years. For example, Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2009) 
examine the dynamics in the volumes of cross-listing on the NYSE and the LSE. They show that 
the dynamics are associated with the shifts in host market characteristics, including stock market 
characteristics. Markets, including the US, UK, French, and German markets, were the most 
dominant in years preceding the late 1990s due to their unique market characteristics (Dodd, 2013). 
The late 1990s  saw high competition among global stock markets to attract foreign firms, causing 




al. 2009). Studies explain these patterns using country characteristics such as disclosure standards, 
legal environment, proximity variables, as well as economic performance. For example, Sarkissian 
and Schill (2016b) study the cross-listing waves and shows the relevance of the gravity model in 
explaining international cross-listing patterns. They further show that firms consider the pricing 
efficiencies of the host market. Abdallah and Ioannidis (2010) use a modified global asset pricing 
model and show that firms cross-list when they have strong domestic performance. They also 
postulate that by cross-listing, firms take advantage of their prospective growth opportunities.  
 
Notwithstanding this evidence, studies on the determinants of the cross-listing decision and 
the choice of the host market ignore how the specialization in output in both the local and host 
markets could explain cross-listing decisions of firms, as suggested by Pagano et al. (2002). 
Following the reasoning of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), which argues that country 
characteristics motivate asset allocation, we draw from the international economics literature on 
specialization in output to explain the cross-listing decisions of firms. 
 
We follow the international economics and cross-listing literature that argues that firms’ 
cross-listing decisions and the choice of the host market are motivated by the characteristics of the 
local and host markets. We conjecture that specialization in output suggests competition among 
firms for funds. Such competition can drive firms to seek funds from foreign markets through cross-
listing. We also conjecture that firms may pursue or avoid cross-listing in countries that are 









3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
This study aims to examine how specialization in output influences the cross-listing 
decisions and the choice of the host country. We utilize data from the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries for the period 1995 to 2014. The OECD sample 
provides a range of economies that are specialized across different industries. This data, therefore, 
enables us to provide a comprehensive examination of this relationship over a reasonably long 
period. Also, OECD countries show evidence of higher predisposition towards maintaining 
specialization in output for particular industries and exhibit high reluctance to de-specialize in short 
to medium term, making it suitable for this study (Dalum, Laursen, and Villumsen, 1998). Table 
B.3 (in Appendix) provides the list of sample countries and the number of firms. 
 
 For the list of cross-listed firms, we employ the DataStream database. For each given cross-
listing, the database provides details of the local and host countries, types of listing instruments 
including Close-Ended funds, Exchange-traded funds (ETF), American Depository Receipts 
(ADR), General Depository Receipts (GDR), common and preferences shares. The initial sample 
consists of 4961 firms from 34 OECD countries, which includes dead/delisted firms, merged and 
acquired firms, close-ended funds, exchange-traded funds, preference shares, and, most 
importantly, involuntary listings. Following Doidge et al. (2009) and Sarkissian and Schill (2016), 
we consider only cross-listing, which are firm-initiated. Doidge et al. (2009) and Sarkissian and 
Schill (2016) suggest that the use of firm-initiated cross-listings are significant in the examination 
of the determinants of cross-listing decisions as they indicate a throughout-decision.  
  
Further, we include the value of cross-listing pairs for all sample periods. It is essential to 
mention that the frequency of the data meant that there was at least one cross-listing for each sample 




However, we ignore listings in Germany and Latvia; for data inconsistency and selection criteria 
failure reasons, respectively21. 
 
Next, we compare the cross-listing data from DataStream for the US to that provided by the 
Bank of New York Mellon Corporation and JP Morgan Chase and Co. websites. The Bank of New 
York and JP Morgan ADR depository websites provide cross-listing data (mostly ADRs and GDRs) 
from selected markets with emphasis on the US. For the US, the current study considers only firms 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the NASDAQ. The NYSE and NASDAQ are 
two of the largest stock exchanges in the US and the world. These stock markets have comparatively 
higher listing requirements, better shareholder protection frameworks, and disclosure requirements. 
They are also two of the most desired host equity markets in the US for most cross-listing firms 
(Doidge et al. 2009, and Abdallah and Ioannidis 2010). The implementation of the selection criteria 
leaves the sample standing at 1779 from 34 OECD countries. This reduction does not affect the 
implication of our results, given that the inclusion of the excluded firms will provide unrealistic and 
biased results with flawed economic consequences.   
 
For firm-level analysis, we employ firm-level characteristics including performance 
variables: return on assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑘,𝑡), return on capital employed (𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑘,𝑡), gross profit margin 
(𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖,𝑘,𝑡) and log of sales scaled by the logarithm of the real Gross Domestic Products of country 
𝑖 (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑘,𝑡 and size variables: total assets scaled by real Gross Domestic Products of country 
𝑖 (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 sourced from DataStream (Table B.2 provides data definition and 
source). Also, to understand whether industry trends motivate these results, we create an industry 
aggregate of cross-listings by summing the firm-level data by industry. We present industry codes 
and the number of firms in Table B.1 (in Appendix). 
  
 
21 The sample does not include cross-listing from Germany due to the data size and discrepancies. Foreign listed firms 




A large body of literature shows that market development of both the local and host markets 
determines the cross-listing decision and the choice of the host market (Hargis, 2000, Claessens et 
al., 2006, and Korczak and Korczak, 2013). In particular, Claessens et al. (2006) show that firms 
from developed markets engage in more cross-listing compared to those from developing markets. 
They base their argument on the premise that firms from developed markets cross-list in response 
to the need of foreign investors who prefer firms from markets with sound fundamentals.  Korczak 
and Korczak (2013), on the other hand, shows that firms from developing markets engage in more 
cross-listing to seek markets with more robust fundamentals. They further suggest that cross-listing 
reduces as the local market develops and becomes more robust. Therefore, we employ market 
development indicator, market capitalization scaled by Gross Domestic Product (𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡/
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃 𝑗,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡) of the local (country 𝑖)  and host (country 𝑗)  markets. This enables 
us to capture their impact on corporate cross-listing decisions. We also employ data on 
specialization in the output of the local and host market, measured as the value-added to the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) by each industry22. We extract this data from the OECD National 
Accounts Statistics database. Given that specialization data is categorized by the International 
Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) Revision 4, we match our sample firms with their 
corresponding ISIC coding23.   
 
We use data on bilateral trade relationships between the local and host country extracted from the 
Structural Analysis (STAN) database, measured by the bilateral exports between the local and host 
markets. By adopting this data, we can capture existing bilateral trade linkages between the local 
and host markets and their impact on cross-listing decisions for both countries. Common to the 
gravity models in international trade literature, we employ a considerable number of dummy 
variables that capture common bilateral cultural factors. These factors include contiguous 
 
22 https://data.oecd.org/ 
23 The ISIC code provides coding for a broader classification of industry activities. Rev 4 is the latest available 




(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑗), common language (𝐶𝑜𝑚_𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡), common region (𝐶𝑜𝑚_𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡), 
distance (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) and a common legal framework (𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙_𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) from the French 
Research Centre in International Economics (CEPII)24.   
 
Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics for the main variables adopted in this study. It 
categorizes them under local market (country 𝑖) and host market (country 𝑗) characteristics, firm 
characteristics, and bilateral factors for the period 1995 to 2014. We observe a relatively similar 
median and mean values for both the local and host markets’ output concentration (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑘,𝑡). These 
initial statistics are quite intuitive based on the background that most of the sample countries are 
developed markets, with specialized outputs. We also observe low standard deviations for all 
financial performance variables (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑘,𝑡, 𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 , and 𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖,𝑘,𝑡). This observation may suggest 
that the financial performance of the sample firms is generally similar. We again observe that Gross 
Profit Margin (𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖,𝑘,𝑡), Return on Assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑘,𝑡) and Return on Capital Employed (𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑘,𝑡) 
are the most negatively skewed. However, most of the variables are positively skewed with the 
logarithm of sales scaled by the log of GDP of country 𝑖, (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑘,𝑡 , and total asset scaled 
by total productivity of country 𝑖  (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 being the most positively skewed. 
Values for kurtosis show majority of the variables have heavier tails than a normal distribution 
except common legal framework (𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙_𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑗,𝑡), distance ( 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡), common region 
(𝐶𝑜𝑚_𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡), common language (𝐶𝑜𝑚_𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) and contiguous (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑗), 
which has a light tail. To check the stationarity of the series, we implement the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test and report that the series is stationary. Tables 3.2 provides the correlation matrix 
of the variables. The maximum and minimum correlation values suggest the absence of any 








Table 3. 1: Descriptive Statistics for Firm-level Analysis  
Variables  Mean 
 




Skewness  Kurtosis 
 
ADF 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡  0.014 0.013 0.051 0.001 0.005 30.565 1495.432 
 
-70.72*** 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑘,𝑡  0.024 0.015 0.096 0.003 0.003 5.379 47.220 
 
-48.64*** 





Characteristics        
 
𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  0.095 0.095 0.397 0.001 0.048 69.304 474.549 
 
-126.45*** 
𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑗,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 0.016 0.014 0.397 0.001 0.095 30.964 194.280 
 
-123.82*** 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  2.280 2.820 3.050 0.226 0.015 -0.277 25.963 
 
-61.49*** 




Firm Characteristics        
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑘,𝑡 0.009 0.005 0.067 -0.002 0.105 -145.805 22395.240 
 
-46.25*** 
𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑘,𝑡  0.029 0.072 0. 330 -0.001 0.005 -162.637 26492.990 
 
-52.58*** 
𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 0.006 0.003 0.296 -0.042 0.033 -99.897 12002.710 
 
-233.16*** 








Bilateral Factors        
 
𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙_𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  0.563 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.496 -0.253 1.064 
 
-90.44*** 
E𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  0.063 0.015 0.203 0.023 0.012 5.181 47.846 
 
-76.71*** 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.004 0.001 -0.121 1.694 
 
-90.44*** 
𝐶𝑜𝑚_𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  0.630 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.483 -0.381 1.145 
 
-90.44*** 
𝐶𝑜𝑚_𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.408 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.492 -0.026 1.001 
 
-90.44*** 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  0.301 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.459 0.615 1.378 
 
-90.44*** 
Notes: The table shows the summary statistics for all variables used in the firm-level analysis. It shows the summary 
statistics for firm-level characteristics including performance variables: return on assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑘,𝑡), return on capital 
employed (𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑘,𝑡), gross profit margin (𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖,𝑘,𝑡) and log of sales scaled by the log of the real Gross Domestic 
Products of country 𝑖 (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑘,𝑡 and size variables: total assets scaled by real Gross Domestic Products of country 
𝑖 (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖,𝑘,𝑡. It also provides the summary statistics for the  common bilateral cultural factors including 
contiguous (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑗), common language (𝐶𝑜𝑚_𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) common region (𝐶𝑜𝑚_𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡), distance 
(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) and a common legal framework (𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙_𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) employed in this study. The table also shows the 
employed country market development variables including, market capitalization scaled by Gross Domestic Product 
(𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃 𝑗,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡) of the local (country 𝑖)  and host (country 𝑗). This allows us to examine 





Table 3. 2: Correlation Matrix (Firm-Level) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡 
1 
                 
2.𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 
-0.020 1 
                
3.𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑘,𝑡  
-0.026 0.124 1 
               
4.𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  
-0.016 -0.010 -0.056 1 
              
5.𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑗,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 
-0.111 -0.018 0.159 0.025 1 
             
6.𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  
-0.038 -0.163 0.053 0.188 0.242 1 
            
7.𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 
-0.110 0.107 -0.195 0.173 -0.420 -0.142 1 
           
8.𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑘,𝑡  
0.034 -0.019 0.010 -0.055 0.022 -0.032 -0.035 1 
          
9.𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑘,𝑡 
0.001 0.002 0.000 0.010 -0.012 0.013 0.008 0.026 1 
         
10.𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖,𝑘,𝑡  
0.003 0.006 0.013 -0.008 0.010 0.013 -0.017 0.049 0.000 1 
        
11.(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑘,𝑡  
0.159 -0.026 -0.012 -0.018 0.052 -0.002 -0.195 0.025 0.002 0.004 1 
       
12.(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖,𝑘,𝑡  
0.205 -0.042 -0.004 -0.022 0.081 -0.002 -0.257 0.027 0.002 0.005 0.887 1 
      
13.𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙_𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
-0.034 -0.124 0.007 -0.252 0.033 -0.341 -0.049 0.045 -0.007 0.010 -0.039 -0.029 1 
     
14.E𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  
-0.017 -0.033 0.038 0.000 -0.257 -0.403 0.071 -0.011 -0.008 0.003 -0.028 -0.047 0.256 1 
    
15.𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
-0.021 0.138 0.033 0.314 -0.118 0.315 0.220 0.009 0.010 0.017 -0.081 -0.107 -0.525 -0.139 1 
   
16.𝐶𝑜𝑚_𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  
0.060 -0.115 0.030 -0.340 -0.079 -0.394 -0.195 0.028 -0.007 -0.011 0.053 0.076 0.538 0.182 -0.838 1 
  
17.𝐶𝑜𝑚_𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  
-0.053 -0.070 0.044 -0.184 0.211 -0.212 0.014 0.011 -0.010 0.006 0.040 0.043 0.594 0.105 -0.349 0.302 1 
 
18.𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  
-0.040 -0.141 -0.053 -0.278 0.174 0.002 -0.005 0.004 -0.012 0.004 0.045 0.048 0.502 -0.085 -0.680 0.582 0.579 1 
Notes: The table shows the correlation matrix for all variables used in the industry-level analysis. It shows the correlation matrix of the industry-level characteristics including 
performance variables: return on assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑘,𝑡), return on capital employed (𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑘,𝑡), gross profit margin (𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖,𝑘,𝑡) and log of sales scaled by the log of the real Gross Domestic 
Products of country 𝑖 (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑘,𝑡 and size variables: total assets scaled by real Gross Domestic Products of country 𝑖 (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖,𝑘,𝑡. It also provides the correlation 
matrix of  the  common bilateral cultural factors including contiguous (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑗), common language (𝐶𝑜𝑚_𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) common region (𝐶𝑜𝑚_𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡), distance 
(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) and a common legal framework (𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙_𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) employed in this study. The table also shows the correlation matrix of the employed country market development 
variables including, market capitalization scaled by Gross Domestic Product (𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃 𝑗,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡) of the host (country 𝑖)  and host (country 𝑗). This allows 




Similarly, Table 3.3 presents the summary statistics for the industry characteristics, local 
and host market characteristics, and the bilateral linkages. For the industry characteristics, we create 
an industry matrix by averaging the firm performance ratios (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑘,𝑡, 𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 and 𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖,𝑘,𝑡) 
while aggregating the cross-listings at the firm level to industry basis, allowing for industry analysis. 
From Table 3.2, we observe that the standard deviations of most of the variables indicate close 
dispersion around their means for both industry, local, and host country characteristics. Most of the 
variables are positively skewed except 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑘,𝑡, 𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 , 𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 , 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 and the proximity 
variables (𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙_𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑗,  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗 and 𝐶𝑜𝑚_𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗). Combining the skewness and 
kurtosis values of the data for the variables employed in this study, we can generalize that the data 
is not normally distributed, indicating general positive skewness and peaked. We test the stationarity 
of our variables by implementing the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and find the series to 
be stationary. Tables 3.4 provides the correlation matrix of the variables. Again, the maximum and 














Skewness  Kurtosis 
 
ADF 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡  0.076 0.075 0.396 0.001 0.001 23.589 840.729 
 
-39.41*** 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑘,𝑡  0.024 0.015 0.096 0.003 0.003 5.379 47.220 
 
-42.69*** 





Characteristics        
 
𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  0.100 0.100 0.400 0.007 0.051 0.976 5.430 
 
-61.02*** 
𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑗,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 0.138 0.123 0.397 0.118 0.924 0.542 2.267 
 
-53.18*** 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  2.788 2.799 3.049 2.263 0.150 -0.119 2.556 
 
-65.73*** 





Characteristics        
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑘,𝑡 1.634 1.823 8.661 -4.605 1.034 -102.784 11129.790 
 
-80.24*** 
𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑘,𝑡  2.114 2.219 7.168 -4.611 0.935 -114.393 13107.230 
 
-77.30*** 
𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 3.415 3.497 10.295 -2.659 0.720 -72.563 6343.959 
 
-75.78*** 








Bilateral Factors        
 
𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙_𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  0.531 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.499 -0.126 1.016 
 
-55.87*** 
E𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  0.005 0.001 0.156 0.001 0.011 4.981 42.141 
 
-83.05*** 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.004 0.001 -0.082 1.882 
 
-55.87*** 
𝐶𝑜𝑚_𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  0.630 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.483 -0.538 1.290 
 
-55.87*** 
𝐶𝑜𝑚_𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 0.408 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.492 0.372 1.139 
 
-55.87*** 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  0.301 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.459 0.868 1.754 
 
-55.87*** 
Notes: The table shows the summary statistics for all variables used in the industry-level analysis. It shows the summary 
statistics for industry-level characteristics including performance variables: return on assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑘,𝑡), return on capital 
employed (𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑘,𝑡), gross profit margin (𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖,𝑘,𝑡) and log of sales scaled by the log of the real Gross Domestic 
Products of country 𝑖 (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑘,𝑡 and size variables: total assets scaled by real Gross Domestic Products of country 
𝑖 (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖,𝑘,𝑡. It also provides the summary statistics for the  common bilateral cultural factors including 
contiguous (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑗), common language (𝐶𝑜𝑚_𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) common region (𝐶𝑜𝑚_𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡), distance 
(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) and a common legal framework (𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙_𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) employed in this study. The table also shows the 
employed country market development variables including, market capitalization scaled by Gross Domestic Product 





Table 3. 4:Correlation Matrix (Industry-Level) 
Notes: The table shows the correlation matrix for all variables used in the industry-level analysis. It shows the correlation matrix for industry-level characteristics including 
performance variables: return on assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑘,𝑡), return on capital employed (𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑘,𝑡), Gross Profit Margin (𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖,𝑘,𝑡) and log of sales scaled by the log of the real Gross Domestic 
Products of country 𝑖 (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑘,𝑡 and size variables: total assets scaled by real Gross Domestic products of country 𝑖 (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖,𝑘,𝑡. It also provides the correlation 
matrix for the common bilateral cultural factors including contiguous (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑗), common language (𝐶𝑜𝑚_𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) common region (𝐶𝑜𝑚_𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡), distance 
(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) and a common legal framework (𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙_𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) employed in this study. The table also shows the correlation matrix of the employed country market development 
variables including, market capitalization scaled by Gross Domestic Product (𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃 𝑗,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡) of the host (country 𝑖)  and host (country 𝑗). This allows 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡 
1 
                 
2.𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 
0.276 1 
                
3.𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑘,𝑡  
-0.019 0.263 1 
               
4.𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  
-0.052 0.059 0.025 1 
              
5.𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑗,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 
-0.099 0.016 0.081 0.000 1 
             
6.𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  
0.057 0.051 -0.046 0.231 0.058 1 
            
7.𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 
-0.111 -0.001 0.104 0.106 -0.296 -0.198 1 
           
8.𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑘,𝑡  
0.003 0.008 0.012 -0.020 0.002 0.001 -0.025 1 
          
9.𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑘,𝑡 
-0.005 0.019 0.015 -0.047 0.033 -0.068 0.005 -0.006 1 
         
10.𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖,𝑘,𝑡  
0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.037 0.019 0.004 -0.028 0.090 0.041 1 
        
11.(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑘,𝑡  
-0.001 -0.022 -0.042 -0.029 0.169 0.035 -0.261 0.004 0.047 0.014 1 
       
12.(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠/
𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 
0.000 0.008 -0.005 -0.012 0.193 0.076 -0.254 0.004 0.002 0.028 0.555 1 
      
13.𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙_𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
-0.037 0.038 0.020 -0.162 0.147 -0.184 -0.069 -0.013 0.050 -0.014 0.013 0.036 1 
     
14.E𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  
0.013 0.046 -0.021 0.087 -0.095 -0.340 0.031 0.007 0.003 0.001 -0.035 -0.060 0.245 1 
    
15.𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
-0.025 -0.109 -0.057 0.172 -0.248 0.220 0.261 0.007 -0.026 0.011 -0.131 -0.117 -0.451 -0.206 1 
   
16.𝐶𝑜𝑚_𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  




-0.078 0.092 0.191 -0.091 0.189 -0.162 0.092 -0.016 0.038 -0.009 0.029 -0.014 0.511 0.144 -0.146 0.116 1 
 
18.𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  







The study begins by examining the impact of local and host countries’ specialization in 
output on corporate cross-listings decisions. Cross-listing is regarded as a form of international asset 
flow. Consequently, examining bilateral cross-listing flows between local and host countries will 
be comparable to modeling a gravity model for bilateral financial asset flow (Domowitz, Glen and 
Madhavan, 1998, and Foerster and Karolyi, 1999). The gravity model is conventionally used in the 
international trade literature to explain trade patterns between countries. The main implication of 
this model is that the bilateral flow of trade between a set of countries is subject to their economic 
sizes and the distance between those countries.  Specifically, the gravity model suggests that good 
economic indicators attract trade between countries while greater distance weakens this attraction 
(Bergstrand, 1985, and Chițu, Eichengreen, and Mehl, 2013).  Subsequently, we employ a gravity 
model for bilateral financial asset flow from the international trade literature (Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti, 2008). Our model infers that the bilateral cross-listing volume between the host and the 
local country is a positive function of the local and host market’s performance and proximity. The 
performance of the local and host countries is proxied by real Gros Domestic Product (GDP). 
Proximity is measured by the similarities between the host and local countries, based on the 
geographic distance, common language, common legal framework, and contiguousness in line with 
the gravity model (Chițu et al. 2013) 25. 
 
The initial econometric model we derive from the general gravity framework is as: 
 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑘 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡 + ∅1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 + ∅2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑘,𝑡 +  𝑧𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡                                    (1) 
 
 




where the dependent variable, 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡, is the share of cross-listing from a firm (industry) 𝑘  in 
the local market (country i ) to a particular industry in the host country (country 𝑗) at time 𝑡. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 
represents the value-added (contribution to GDP) by industry 𝑘 to the total national output of 
country 𝑖 at time t. Similarly, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑘,𝑡 is the value added by industry 𝑘 to the total national output 
of country 𝑗 at time 𝑡. By using 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑘,𝑡 the study captures how specialization of both 
the local (country 𝑖) and host (country 𝑗) countries impacts corporate cross-listing decisions. 𝑧𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 is 
a matrix that represents firm(industry) specific characteristics including performance and 
profitability variables. These variables include Return on Assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑘,𝑡) Return on capital 
employed (𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑘,𝑡), Gross Profit Margin (𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖,𝑘,𝑡), the log of Sales scaled by the logarithm of 
real GDP ((𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑘,𝑡)  and total assets scaled by real GDP (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 . 
 
This study includes the gravity equation variables along with bilateral linkage variables 
captured in (𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡), including E𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  as well as market development variables 
(𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  and 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑗,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡) following the gravity model. Dodd, Frijns, and 
Gilbert (2015) show that bilateral cultural/common factors immensely influence the cross-listing 
decision and the choice of the host market. Similarly, Bianconi and Tan (2010) show that firms 
from common law countries tend to have better corporate governance culture, thus fostering cross-
listing to markets with a similar legal framework. We control for the impact of such proximity 
variables including common language (𝐶𝑜𝑚_𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗), geographical proximity 
(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑗  and 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗) and similarities in the legal framework (𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙_𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑗) 
consistent with the gravity model. The common bilateral variables are dummy variables that take 
the value of 1 if country 𝑖 and country 𝑗 share similar cultural factors and 0 if otherwise except 
distance variable (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗). Distance is the distance between the capitals of country 𝑖 and 






3.5 Estimation Results and Analysis 
 
This section presents the estimation results of how the specialization in the output of local 
and host markets impacts the cross-listing decision and the choice of the host market. The section 
begins with a firm-level analysis and then an industry-level analysis.  
 
3.5.1 Firm-Level Analysis 
  
Table 3.5 presents results from the firm-level analysis for firms from country  𝑖 to country  
𝑗. We report the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with corrected standard error estimation 
results in column 1. T-statistics are presented in parenthesis. 
Focusing on the main contribution of this paper, output concentration (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑘,𝑡) has a 
significant and positive impact on the cross-listing decisions and the choice of the host market. The 
finding suggests that firms from the local country (i) that specialize in a particular industry engage 
in more cross-listing compared to their less specialized counterparts. This might indeed be 
considered as a solid sign of firms seeking diversification of sources of funds as well as a means of 
firms seeking less competition. These results are also important indications that as local industries 
become more competitive through specialization, firms tend to spillover to other markets, following 
the findings by Claessens et al. (2001). Also, this finding is in line with Greenaway, Sousa, and 
Wakelin (2004), who show that the importation of multinational companies into the local market 
fosters stiffer competition. They again show that this competition results in local firms seeking new 
markets and creating an indirect spillover channel in new markets. 
From the host market perspective, specialization in the output of the host country (j) 
(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑘,𝑡) has a significant and negative relationship on the cross-listing decisions of firms. The 
result suggests that firms from local markets (country 𝑖) that are less specialized in their output 




results are also in line with the firms' competition motivations literature, which suggests that firms 
seek host markets that have less competition. From other findings of this paper, the diversification 
of sources of funds motive outweighs the competition motive.  
Table 3.5 also shows that country characteristic: the level of market development of the local 
country (𝑖) measured by 𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 has a positive and significant impact on the cross-
listing decision and the choice of the host market of firms only when we control for both industry 
and year fixed effects. However, the market development of the host market (𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑗,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡) 
has a negative and significant impact on the cross-listing decision and the choice of the host market. 
While this finding suggests that firms from rich and developed markets cross-list more on smaller 
economies, it further supports the initial results that firms look for less competitive markets while 
making the cross-listing decision (Claessens et al. 2006). The real GDP of the local country (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡) 
is positive and significant for all four models, whereas the real GDP of the host country (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡) is 
negative and significant. This finding follows the existing literature that argues that firms from 
developed markets engage in more cross-listing compared to their developing counterparts. 
An examination of the firm characteristics show that firm profitability and performance 
variables including, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑘,𝑡, 𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑘,𝑡, 𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑘,𝑡 and (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑘,𝑡 are positive and significant, 
suggesting that profitable firms engage in more cross-listing, consistent with the findings of Pagano 
et al. (2002) and Lang et al. (2003). Also, (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 is positive and significant, 
indicating that larger firms engage in more cross-listing compared to smaller firms (Dodd et al. 
2015). The findings are intuitive, given that small, medium-sized, and non-profitable firms find it 
challenging to manage the initial cost cross-listing costs, as shown in the literature26. 
Results from the bilateral factors provide interesting points of discussion. First, Distance 
(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗), common language (𝐶𝑜𝑚_𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗) and common region (𝐶𝑜𝑚_𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗) are 
 




positive and significant, suggesting that firms look for markets that are geographically further away 
from their local market, opposing the gravity rule. 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑗  is negative and significant, 
providing more evidence that firms seek diversification opportunities and suggest a weakening of 
the proximity bias. The finding can be viewed as an indication of firms seeking diversification 
outside proximate markets. Common legal system (𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙_𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑗) is negative and insignificant. 
E𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 of the local market has a significant and negative impact on cross-listing 
decisions, suggesting that trade connections between countries negatively impact cross-listing, 
against the gravity argument indicated in the international finance literature27. The opposite and 
significant signs of the gravity equation variables (as opposed to the previous research by Frenkel 
et al. (2004), Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007), and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) ) also support our 
argument that firms look for less competitive markets while making the cross-listing decision.  
We control for industry fixed effects in column 2 and document an increase in the 
coefficients of 𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑘,𝑡, 𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑘,𝑡 and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑘,𝑡 but they become negative and insignificant. All other 
variables remain very similar to the initial coefficients in column 1. Similarly, Column 3 reports 
estimation results with time fixed effect controlled for, while column 4 reports estimation results 
with both industry-fixed effects and time-fixed effects controlled. The results from columns 2, 3, 































































Notes:  The dependent variable (𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡) is the share/ratio of cross-listing from industry  𝑘 in country 𝑖 to industry  
𝑘 in country 𝑗.*, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Variable definitions are given in Table B.2. Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation corrected standard errors are used 
for the estimation. T-statistics are presented in parenthesis. The ADF unit root test is implemented, and all variables are 




Variables   (1)   (2)   (3)     (4) 
















     
Country Characteristics     
































Firm Characteristics     
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑘,𝑡   7.34*** 
(3.91) 
  11.64*** 
(5.15) 
  10.66*** 
(5.34) 
  11.27*** 
(5.25) 
































Bilateral Factors     
















































     
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Observations 11809 11809 11809 11809 
Time Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes 





3.5.2 Industry Level Analysis 
 
Table 3.6 presents the industry-level analysis of cross-listing decisions from country 𝑖 to 𝑗. 
We sum up the cross-listing values and create industry aggregates and implement the models again 
aimed at providing an industrial perspective of the relationship. We report Pooled Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) with corrected standard error estimation results in column 1 Table 3.6. T-statistics 
are presented in parenthesis. 
At the industry-level, specialization in output (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑘,𝑡) in the local market has a significant 
and positive impact on the cross-listing decision and the choice of the host market of firms. Similar 
to the firm-level estimation results, this suggests that industries with the highest contribution to the 
total national output of country 𝑖 engage in more cross-listing compared to industries that contribute 
less. We also report that specialization in output in the host market is significant and negative. This 
finding supports the initial firm-level analysis in Table 3.5 and suggests that at the industry level, 
firms seek less competition. The results also show that firms from local markets (𝑖 ) with low 
specialization in the output of industry (𝑘) do not engage in cross-listing to a host country (𝑗) if the 
country (𝑗) is specialized in that given industry. Our finding closely follows the arguments that 
sound fundamentals increase cross-listing. 
 
Market development variables for both local (𝑖) and host (𝑗) countries are negative and 
significant, suggesting that industries in small countries cross-list more in larger economies. This 
finding is in line with the stream of literature, which proposes that firms cross-list as a result of 
weak local markets to seek better functioning host markets (Korczak and Korczak 2013). Real GDP 
of the local country (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡) is positive and significant while the real GDP of the host country 
(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡) is negative and significant, similar to the firm-level analysis results in Table 3.5.  
 
Profitability and performance variables follow those in the firm-level analysis. In particular, 




profit margin (𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖,𝑘,𝑡) and (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑘,𝑡 are all negative and insignificant with only 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 
being significant. The result provides further support to the relevance of profitability to the cross-
listing decision and the choice of the host market indicated in earlier results. 
 
Common legal system (𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙_𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑗) has a negative and significant impact on the cross-
listing decision and the choice of the host market of firms. While E𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is negative and 
significant, distance is positive but insignificant. Common region (𝐶𝑜𝑚_𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗) is positive and 
significant, common language (𝐶𝑜𝑚_𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗) and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑗  are negative and significant. 
Together, the bilateral variables add to our argument that firms seek opportunities to diversify 
sources of funding. The results also suggest a weakening of the gravity rules in the international 
economics and finance literature.  
 
Next, we control for industry fixed effect and time fixed effect in columns 2 and 3, 
respectively, and observe no significant changes to the results reported in column 1. However, 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 becomes positive and significant. Column 4 reports the estimation results with control for 
both time and industry fixed effects, with no substantial changes to the initial results.  
 
We further check the robustness of our results by firstly dividing the data into deciles based 
on industries that dominate a given country. We also create dummies by allocating the value of 1 to 
industries that dominate a given country and 0 otherwise. These control for the fact that 
specialization in specific industries of countries might not be comparable, given the differences in 
the economic size of countries. The results from this estimation are similar and provide support to 









Table 3. 6: Determinants of cross-border listings: Analysis at the Industry-level  
 
Variables   (1)   (2)  (3)   (4) 
















Country Characteristics     









































































Bilateral Factors     
















































     
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.17 0.13 0.18 
Observations 5712 5712 5712 5712 
Time Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects No No No Yes 
 
Notes: Dependent variable (∆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡): the share/ratio of cross-listing from industry  𝑘 in country 𝑖 to industry 
  𝑘 in country 𝑗.*, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
We multiply the coefficients of Common language and common region by 1000 for presentation purposes as the 
coefficients are less than 1%. Variable definitions are given in Table B.2. Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation 
corrected standard errors are adopted for the estimation. T-statistics are presented in parenthesis. The ADF unit root 





3.5.3 Robustness Checks: Dynamic GMM model analysis  
 
Previous studies on the determinants of cross-listing decisions show that the bilateral cross-
listing between the local and host market is likely to be influenced by existing cross-listings. (e.g., 
Benos and Weisbach, 2004). Benos and Weisbach (2004) argue that cross-listing in a given host 
market is associated with the success and the presence of firms from the same industry. This is 
likely to create a familiarity bias, especially for firms from the same country or industry (Leblang 
2010). Consistent with this literature, our results shown in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 could be a result of 
an existing cross-listing effect and the lag effects of the independent variable. To overcome this 
problem, we establish a difference Generalized Method of Moment model (GMM), which considers 
the lag of the dependent variable and the independent variables. We employ a panel GMM model 
with a first difference transformation and a white period-instrument weighting matrix. By 
implementing this method, we provide Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) 
estimates of the standard errors and covariance matrix given in Equation (1). Furthermore, we can 
test the robustness of our results by adopting the GMM model. The study used the difference GMM 
instead of the system GMM approach in line with Bond (2001). Bond (2001) indicates that if the 
estimated coefficient of the primary variable from the difference GMM approach is lower than that 
of the fixed effect approach, a systems GMM is appropriate. These conditions are not met; hence, 
the current study uses the difference GMM approach using the lags of both the dependent and 
independent variables as instruments. Again, based on Bond’s criteria, we cannot conclude that the 
instruments used are weak. 
 
The GMM model is expressed as: 
 





Table 3.7 presents the firm-level GMM estimation results for the determinants of bilateral 
cross-listing decisions and the choice of the host markets between the local and host countries. We 
implement a first difference transformation panel GMM model with a period instrument weighting 
matrix. We test for first, and second-order correlation using Arellano-Bond (AB1 and AB2) tests 
and report the same in Table 3.7.  The results from these tests yield P-values higher than 10%, which 
suggests that we do not have enough evidence of the presence of autocorrelation. The results from 
the first and second-order correlation tests further validate the use of suitably lagged endogenous 
variables as instruments. Moreover, we test for over-identification restrictions, and the P-values are 
higher than 10%. We, therefore, fail to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments used are 
exogenous in our model.  
 
We document some important results from the GMM estimations. The results of the GMM 
estimation show that the lag of the dependent variable is positive and significant to the cross-listing 
decision and the choice of the host market. This finding suggests that existing cross-listings 
influence the bilateral cross-listing between the local and host countries for a given period. The 
result could be due to the success experienced by firms already cross-listed in such markets, which 
follows the familiarity bias argument (e.g., Dodd et al., 2015).  Specialization in the output of the 
local market (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑘,𝑡) has a positive and significant impact on the dependent variable, consistent 
with initial results in the model (1). However, the output concentration of the host market (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑘,𝑡) 
remains negative, yet insignificant.  
We also find that local market development (𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 ) has a negative and 
significant impact on the proportion of cross-listing similar to Korczak and Korczak (2013), which 
shows that less developed local markets engage in more cross-listing as compared to developed 
ones. The market development of the host market (𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑗,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 ) is negative and 




inferred that the findings are similar to those reported in the previous examinations in the OLS 
analysis. 
 
For the firm-specific characteristics, return on assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑘,𝑡) is positive and significant 
while return on capital employed (𝑅𝑂𝐶𝐸𝑖,𝑘,𝑡) is negative and significant. Gross Profit Margin 
(𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖,𝑘,𝑡) is negative and insignificant. Log of Sales normalized by the logarithm of real GDP of 
the local market (𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖𝑘,𝑡 is negative and significant while total assets scaled by real GDP 
of local country, (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖,𝑘,𝑡, is positive and significant. Bilateral factor, 
E𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 although negative is not significant. In a nutshell, for most of the variables, these 

























































Notes: Dependent variable (∆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡): the change in the share/ratio of cross-listing from industry  𝑘  
in country 𝑖 to industry  𝑘 in country 𝑗.*, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant a 
t 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. T-statistics are presented in parenthesis. First Difference GMM model 
with white period-instrument weighting matrix is implemented, providing heteroscedasticity consistent  
estimates of the covariance matrix.  
 
Table 3.8 presents the industry-level GMM estimation results. Similar to the firm-level 
analysis in Table 3.7, we implement a first difference transformation panel GMM model with the 
period-instrument weighting matrix. We test for first and second-order correlation using Arellano-
Bond (AB1 and AB2) tests. The P-values are higher than 10%, implying we do not have enough 
evidence of the presence of autocorrelation, further validating the use of suitably lagged endogenous 
variables as instruments. Again, we test for over-identification restrictions, and the P-values are 
higher than 10%. Thus, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous in 






















































AB (1) Test P-Value 0.40 0.35 
AB (2) Test P-Value 0.31 0.92 
Sargan Statistics P-value 0.16 0.11 




our model. We find that the lag of the dependent variable (𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡−1 ) remains positive and 
significant. Also, the output concentration of the local country (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑘,𝑡) is a positive and significant 
determinant of cross-listing, emphasizing our initial findings in Tables 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7. Although 
the specialization in the output of the local country (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑘,𝑡) is negative, it is not significant. 
 
Similar to the findings in Table 3.6 and consistent with Korczak and Korczak (2013), market 
development of the local country (𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 )  shows that less developed markets engage 
in more foreign listing. This finding could be due to more significant financing opportunities in 
some overseas markets, as demonstrated by previous studies on the motivation of cross-listing. For 
firm characteristics, we observe inconsistent results similar to earlier results shown in Table 3.4. 
Exports normalized by real GDP (E𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡) of the local market is negative and 
significant, reiterating the argument that firms do not obey the gravity rule when they cross-list 
abroad. Although there are some minor variations in some variables, most of the results support the 
initial results.  
Overall, results from both the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) examination and the General 
Method of Moments (GMM) suggest that specialization in output motivates the decision to cross-
list and the choice of the host market. The results provide evidence of firms seeking markets that 
are less competitive in their industry. Other findings from both the firm and industry-level analyses 
suggest the existence of the familiarity bias in the cross-listing decision and the choice of the host 










Table 3. 8: Determinants of cross-border listings: GMM Analysis at the Industry-level 
Notes: Dependent variable (∆𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡): the change in the share/ratio of cross-listing from industry  𝑘 in 
 country 𝑖 to industry  𝑘 in country 𝑗.*, ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at  
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. T-statistics are presented in parenthesis. First Difference GMM model  
with white period-instrument weighting matrix is implemented, providing heteroscedasticity consistent  










































































AB (1) Test P-Value 0.34 0.33  
AB (2) Test P-Value 0.48 0.32  
Sargan Statistics P-value 0.10 0.11  




3.6 Conclusion  
 
The current paper examines how specialization in the output of the local and host markets 
influences the cross-listing decision and the choice of the host market at both the firm and industry-
levels. The study utilizes bilateral cross-listing data for 34 countries from the OECD. Countries 
from the OECD are generally specialized in their output, which enables us to undertake this study. 
The study implements selection criteria in line with recent literature, which leaves the sample of 
firms standing at 1779 from 34 OECD countries. This reduction does not affect the implication of 
our results, given that the inclusion of the excluded firms will provide unrealistic and biased results 
with unusable economic inferences. The study also collects firm-level, country-level, and common 
bilateral factors data for the examination. 
 
The study makes important contributions to the existing cross-listing literature. First, the 
overall results of this study show that firms from markets which are specialized in their output 
engage in more cross-listing compared to firms from markets that are not. More interestingly, we 
document that these firms cross-list to markets, which are weak in the given industry. Second, we 
provide a strong indication that the need to diversify funding sources motivates the cross-listing 
decisions of firms. However, it is also evident that firms prefer markets that will offer less industrial 
competition for funding compared to those with higher industrial competition for funding. Third, 
the results suggest the weakening of the proximity bias/preference as firms show evidence cross-
listing in markets that are further from their local market. This finding provides support for the 
argument that firms give more relevance to the funding diversification motive than proximity 
preferences.  
 
The results of this study have important policy implications. First, the findings of this study 
suggest that firms tend to spillover to other foreign countries through cross-listing. This spillover is 
motivated by the specialization in the output of the local market. Second, this study shows that 




of the host market. However, other findings of this study suggest that the diversification of sources 





























Table B. 1: Sectorial Decomposition 
Notes: Table B.1 presents the sectors and sub-sectors per ISIC Rev 4 as well as the number of firms for each sub-sector 
employed in this study. International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) is an international reference classification 






Main Sectors Based on ISIC  Sub-Sector Code  Number of Firms  


































































































Table B. 2: Variable definitions and sources 
Note: This table presents variable definitions and the source of data for this study. Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et 
d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) is a research center which provides international economics database on world 





















Variable Definition Source 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑘,𝑡  Share/ratio of cross-listing from industry  𝑘 in country 
𝑖 to industry  𝑘 in country 𝑗 
Manually calculated by 
the author 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑘,𝑡  The concentration of output of industry/firm 𝑘 in 
country 𝑖 
OECD statistics database 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑘,𝑡  The concentration of output of industry/firm 𝑘 in 
country 𝑗 
OECD statistics database 
𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡  The total market capitalization of all listed firms in 
country 𝑖 scaled by real GDP of country 𝑖  
DataStream 
 
𝑀𝐾𝑇_𝐶𝐴𝑃 𝑗,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡  The total market capitalization of all listed firms in 
country 𝑗 scaled by real GDP of country 𝑗 
DataStream 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑘,𝑡 Return on Assets of a firm (industry) k DataStream 
𝑂𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑘,𝑡  Return on capital employed of a firm (industry) k DataStream 
𝐺𝑃𝑀𝑖𝑘,𝑡 Gross profit margin of firm (industry) k DataStream 
𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙_𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if country 𝑖 
and country 𝑗 have similar law or legal framework 
(civil law or common law) 
Central Intelligence 
Agency's World Fact 
Book 
 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 The ratio of country 𝑖’s real GDP from exports between 
country 𝑖 and country 𝑗 
OECD STAN database 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 Log of the distance between country 𝑖 and country 𝑗 




𝐶𝑜𝑚_𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑗,𝑡  Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if country 𝑖 
and Country 𝑗 belong to the sample geographic region 
CEPII 
𝐶𝑜𝑚_𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if country 𝑖 
and country 𝑗 have a common language as their first 
official language spoken by at least 9% to 20% of the 
population and takes the value of 0 if otherwise 
CEPII 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖,𝑗 Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if country 𝑖 
and country 𝑗 share borders and 0 if otherwise 
CEPII 
 
(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠/𝐺𝐷𝑃)𝑖,𝑘,𝑡 Log of Net sales of a firm (industry) k scaled by the log 









𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 The log of real Gross Local Product of country 𝑖 OECD statistics database 

































































United Kingdom 210 
United States 371 








Cross-Listing flows under uncertainty: an international perspective 
 
 
This study examines how Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) in the local and global 
markets impacts corporate cross-listing decisions. To this end, we employ corporate and country-
level data from 1990 to 2016 from 13 countries. We implement a Granger Causality, Quantile on 
Quantile Regression (QQR), and Wavelet Coherence approaches. We find that local and global 
EPU influence the cross-listing decisions of firms, with a more substantial impact on firms from 
smaller local markets. Our results suggest that firms from smaller local markets seek more cross-
listing in the face of high local EPU and reduce or avoid cross-listing during periods of high global 
EPU. The findings suggest that policy transparency could have important implications for current 
and future corporate decisions. 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Studies have long shown that the economic fabric of countries influences corporate decisions 
and strategies. However, recent studies note that uncertainties about economic policies have a 
similar impact (Kang, Lee, and Ratti, 2014, Wang, Chen, and Huang, 2014, Gulen and Ion, 2015, 
and Zhang, Han, Pan, and Huang, 2015). These studies explain that economic policies shape the 
economic fabric and characteristics of countries. A vital element of these arguments is that policy 
uncertainty signals fear about current and future market characteristics. Subsequently, a large body 
of literature documents that periods of high policy uncertainty hinder firm growth and expansions, 
in addition to other vital decisions. Policy uncertainty gained research traction when recent topical 




operations and decisions. In particular, policy discussions during the US election, the BREXIT 
referendum, tax reform debates in the UK, US-China trade disagreements among others showed 
significant contribution to high Economic Policy Uncertainties (henceforth, EPU) with significant 
implications for corporations (Baker, Bloom, and Davis, 2016, Bordo, Duca, and Koch, 2016,  Zeng, 
Zhong, and He, 2019, and Xu, 2020)29. Several studies investigate the magnitude of this impact and 
report essential revelations. For example, Handley and Limao (2015) find that firms’ export 
investments reduce during periods of high policy uncertainty. Gulen and Ion (2015) report lower 
firm capital investments during periods of high economic policy uncertainty while Zhang et al. 
(2015) postulate that periods of high EPU result in reduced mergers and acquisitions decisions. 
While these studies focus on corporate decisions that involve sizeable corporate expenditure, a large 
part of their examination is founded on economic policy uncertainty in the local market.  The current 
study provides an analysis of how economic policy uncertainty in both the local and global markets 
impacts corporate cross-listing decisions. 
 
With over 2,000 cross-listed firms on the NYSE, about 1800 on the LSE, over 20,000 American 
Depository Receipts (ADRs) and Global Depository Receipts (GDRs) on several stock markets 
across the globe, cross-listing has shown to be of high relevance to firms30. The extant cross-listing 
literature argues that cross-listing conventionally presented firms the option of raising foreign 
capital, especially firms from developing economies (Khurana et al. 2007; Choi et al. 2009). In 
addition to raising foreign capital, cross-listed firms report increased analyst coverage (Baker et al. 
2002), improved information environment (Bris et al. 2012), improved liquidity (Bacidore and 
Sofianos 2002, and Berkman and Nguyen 2010) better corporate governance (King and Segal 2003, 
Karolyi 2012, and Li et al. 2015) and improved revenue (Pagano et al. 2002, and Dodd 2013). 
Coffee (2002), Lang et al. (2003), and Korczak and Korczak (2013) argue that these benefits are 
 
29 See for example, Caggiano et al. (2017), who shows higher volatility in unemplyment rates during periods of high 
economic policy uncertainties. 
30 The figures are the aapproximation of cross-listing figures from the LSE, NYSE, BNY Mellon and World 




possible due to the macroeconomic characteristics in the local and host markets, which stems from 
government policies.  Thus, the decision to cross-list to a specific host market depends on the market 
characteristics in both the local market and the prospective host market. 
 
The impact of market characteristics on cross-listing decisions and the choice of the host market 
is inconclusive.  The literature presents two opposing arguments. The first argument proposes that 
sound local market fundamentals motivate cross-listing. For example, Claessens et al. (2006) find 
that firms from high-income economies with sound macro policies, efficient legal systems, greater 
market openness, and high growth prospects engage in more cross-listing. This proposition is 
argued from an investor perspective and shows that investors in the host market are likely to 
patronize firms from markets with sound fundamentals. This line of argument suggests that firms 
from markets with sound fundamentals seek cross-listing in an attempt to meet the needs of such 
investors.   
 
The second argument suggests that the decision to cross-list and the choice of the host 
market is motivated by poorly functioning local markets, with inadequate minority shareholder 
protection and inefficient regulatory systems ( e.g., Karolyi 2004, Korczak and Korczak, 2013). 
This argument builds on the premise that cross-listing provides a means of listing on host markets 
with more robust functioning markets. Pagano et al. (2002) add to this argument and indicate that 
countries with more reliable corporate governance standards attract more cross-listing from 
countries with weaker ones31. Supporting the latter evidence, Korczak and Korczak (2013), indicate 
that the number of cross-listings reduces as the local market becomes more developed. Pagano et 
al. (2001) further assert that firms from European countries tend to cross-list on markets that are 
liquid, large, and where firms from their industry are already cross-listed. These two streams of 
arguments suggest that market characteristics are significant in the cross-listing decision and 
provide evidence that firms might be seeking positive market outcomes associated with sound 
 




markets. Despite this evidence, the direction of this impact is unclear. This study builds on previous 
discussions that argue that government policies drive market characteristics. We postulate that if 
policies drive and form the basis of market characteristics, uncertainties about them should be 
significant for the cross-listing decision (e.g., Hall 1989, and Collier and Dollar 2001).  
 
More importantly, periods of high local EPU may have several implications for firms seeking 
to cross-list as well as other firms. First, firms may be discouraged from borrowing from banks 
during high local EPU periods. For example, Zhang et al. (2015) show that firms reduce their 
leverage ratio during periods of high local economic policy uncertainty. They highlight that firms 
revert to using retained earnings and equity as sales and profits drop during high EPU periods. 
Second, lenders are likely to increase the risk premium and demand higher interests as the risk of 
default increases during periods of higher local EPU. For example, Manzo (2013) indicates that a 
10% increase in uncertainty leads to a 3% increase in risk premium demanded by lenders. These 
propositions suggest that firms may increase their cross-listing activities during periods of high local 
economic policy uncertainty as other sources of finances may be more expensive. However, higher 
local EPU may also lead to firms cutting their investment expenditure, as shown by previous studies.  
The cutting of investment might imply a reduction in the need to raise funds from foreign markets 
through cross-listing (Gulen and Ion, 2015). Thus, though periods of high local EPU may drive 
firms abroad, there is also a possibility it may discourage foreign listing as the need for additional 
funds may vanish.  
 
Given this background, we examine how cross-listing decisions and the choice of the host 
market respond to shocks to local and global EPU. To measure economic policy uncertainty, we 
resort to the monthly EPU index of Baker et al. (2016) for 13 countries for the period 1990 to 2016. 
Baker et al. (2016) construct a weighted average frequency count of news articles that contain words 




of three main components, news-based, tax-based, and forecasters’ disagreements as keywords. 
Higher EPU values generally indicate higher economic uncertainty, while lower EPU values 
suggest lower economic uncertainty for each sample month for each country. We then source data 
on the total market value of cross-listing for each month for each sample country and scale them by 
the monthly market capitalization of the local market. 
 
The empirical examination begins with an initial Granger Causality test to test for causality. We 
then adopt a Quantile on Quantile Regression (QQR) approach, and a Wavelet Coherence (WC) 
approach to investigate how local and global EPU impact the cross-listing decisions of firms. The 
Granger Causality approach provides an initial indication of the correlation between the present 
values of cross-listing decisions of firms and the present and lag values of EPU. However, the 
Granger Causality approach does not provide enough evidence of this relationship. We address this 
by implementing two contemporary methods; a Quantile on Quantile Regression approach and a 
wavelet coherence approach. These approaches help us to ascertain an in-depth understanding of 
the relationship between cross-listing decisions and local and global EPU.  
 
Results from the Quantile on Quantile and Wavelet Coherence approaches show that periods 
of high local economic policy uncertainty leads to increased cross-listing. In contrast, periods of 
high global economic policy uncertainty discourages cross-listing. These results are related to recent 
studies that document a negative impact of local EPU on firm expansionary decisions (e.g., Wang, 
Chen, and Huang, 2014, and Zhang et al. 2015). However, the current study differentiates itself 
from recent studies by providing both a time-varying and market-level perspective. The findings 
suggest that smaller economies respond more to local EPU by intensifying cross-listing during high 
EPU periods compared to their larger counterparts. Again the results show this relationship is time-





 This study makes significant contributions to the literature. It offers a thorough examination 
of how policy uncertainty impacts the decision to cross-list. While the findings show that local EPU 




4.2 Related Literature  
 
Economic Policy changes and their impacts are well studied, although these studies show 
mixed results. For example, Engel, Hayes, and Wang (2007) show an increase in the number of 
privatization of firms after the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 in the US. Zhang 
(2007) finds a negative cumulative abnormal return during the SOX Act passage. However, recent 
discussions indicate that due to the documented outcomes of previous policy changes, uncertainties 
about future policy changes and their effects have increased with a more significant impact on 
corporate decisions (Baker et al. 2016). For example, Zhang et al. (2015) indicate that firms tend to 
use internal funds during periods of economic policy uncertainty. Bonaime et al. (2018) argue that 
the rate of mergers and acquisitions reduce significantly during periods of high economic policy 
uncertainty. Brogaard and Detzel (2015) document that an increase of one standard deviation in 
EPU results in a 1.5% increase in forecasted three-month abnormal returns. These studies, among 
others, are indicative of the fact that EPU is a significant economic risk factor that generally has 
implications for corporate decisions and strategies. We contribute to this discussion by examining 
how EPU influences the cross-listing decisions of firms. 
 
Earlier studies on cross-listing argued that the motivation for cross-listing was to raise 
additional funds that were not readily available in the local markets (Lang et al. 2003, Khurana et 
al. 2007, and Sarkissian and Schill 2016). However, recent studies show that additional to raising 




and Korczak 2013). For example, Pagano et al. (2002) show that firms cross-list to improve 
liquidity, increase visibility, for better corporate governance, and as part of their expansionary 
business strategy. Dodd (2013) indicates that these motivations are skewed towards both local and 
host market characteristics than firm-specific characteristics. Doidge et al. (2009) support this 
argument by noting that although firms may possess similar characteristics, foreign firms prefer a 
US listing to other markets due to specific peculiar market characteristics. All these studies, among 
others, emphasize the relevance of market characteristics for the cross-listing decisions of firms. 
 
An extensive literature show that market characteristics are founded on government policies, 
economic or otherwise. For example, Devarajan, Swaroop, and Zou (1996) emphasize a strong 
relationship between government policies on expenditure and total economic growth. They also 
argue that sectors of an economy that receive more government budgets tend to show more 
significant development structurally and become increasingly efficient. These actions encourage 
growth and make those sectors more attractive to foreign corporations that operate in the same or 
similar sectors. Studying the influence of government policies on economic activities, Pastor and 
Veronesi (2012) indicate that changes in government policies influence both the targeted sector as 
well as other sectors closely or remotely connected to the targeted sector. They also show that 
government policies dictate the macroeconomic and institutional frameworks of a given economy 
on which economic activities thrive or fail. Thus, further emphasizing the relevance of government 
economic policies in determining the market structure and characteristics of a given country. They 
also infer that uncertainty about government policies is likely to influence the general confidence 
of market stakeholders and their decisions.  
 
Studies on the influence of Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) on firm decisions focused 
on how either idiosyncratic or general uncertainty influenced corporate operations with more 
emphasis on firm investment and capital structure. For example, Rodrik (1991) indicates that firms 




Ion (2015) show that policy uncertainty can depress corporate investments by inducing a 
precautionary delay because of investment irreversibility. In agreement with this notion, they further 
argue that minimum levels of policy uncertainty could lead to considerable repercussions in firms’ 
drive to invest. Specific to Economic Policy Uncertainty, Wang et al. (2014), among others, 
emphasize that firms reduce their investment as EPU increases, and vice versa32. Julio and Yook 
(2012), using the elections period as a proxy of EPU, argue that periods of economic and political 
uncertainty are accompanied by some 4.8% reduction in firm investment expenditure. These studies 
focus primarily on corporate decisions that involve cost.   
 
A scant body of literature considers the influence of policy uncertainties on corporate capital 
structures. For example, Wang et al. (2014) postulate that during periods of policy uncertainties, 
firms tend to use internal sources of funds, eschewing the benefits of external funding. They argue 
that this decision is mainly a result of higher interest rates demanded by lenders during periods of 
high uncertainty. Myers (1984) examines how firms decide on their sources of funds. He showed 
that firms consider the potential future macroeconomic outlook of their respective countries in 
determining their current and future sources of funds. Supporting this argument, Titman and 
Wessels (1988) examine theories of firm optimal capital structure and indicates that firms’ decisions 
on sources of funds are dependent on attributes that are responsible for the various costs or benefits 
associated with a given type of financing option. They emphasize, additional to firm-specific 
characteristics, that future expectations about the overall economic outcomes play a vital role in 
determining both the choice and the associated cost of the financing option. Feng (2001) argues that 
typically, firms’ investments and capital structure are closely linked to government economic 
policies as these policies indicate the direction of the economy. Thus, unlike other forms of 
uncertainties, economic policy uncertainty is exogenous, making it of grave importance to firm 
decisions. While cross-listing might not be considered a conventional capital structure decision, its 
 




ability to generate foreign funding among other positive market outcomes qualifies it as a potential 
source of financing for firms. 
 
Given this background, this study investigates how and to what extent EPUs in the local and 
host markets influence corporate cross-listing decisions. Of significant note is the fact that periods 
of high local EPU may have two broad implications in the cross-listing decision. First, it is common 
knowledge in recent literature that periods high local EPU may discourage firm borrowing. For 
example, Zhang et al. (2015) show that firms reduce their leverage ratio during periods of high local 
economic policy uncertainty. Their study document that firms revert to using retained earnings and 
equity as sales and profits drop during high EPU periods. Also, lenders are likely to increase the 
risk premium and demand higher interests as the risk of default increases during periods of high 
local EPU. Second, high local EPU may also lead to firms reducing their investment activities; thus, 
their investment expenditure, as shown by previous studies.  Such a reduction in investment might 
reduce the need to raise foreign capital through cross-listing. 
 
Subsequently, periods of high local EPU is likely to either encourage cross-listing due to the 
higher cost of funding in the local market or reduce cross-listing activities due to the reduction in 
the need for foreign capital. This study addresses these issues and contributes to the ongoing 












4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics  
 
In this paper, we analyze the relevance of local and global EPU in the cross-listing decisions 
of firms. We utilize data of firms from 13 countries for the period 1990 to 2016, based on the 
availability of the EPU Index developed by Baker et al. (2016) and continuity of the cross-listing 
data33.  The EPU Index measures the level of general uncertainty at the national level using several 
underlying components. For example, the US EPU comprises of data on the ratio of policy-related 
economic uncertainty newspaper coverage, the number of tax code provisions set to expire, and 
lastly, the level of disagreement among economic forecasters about the prospects of a given country. 
While this is only for the US, other countries use other phrases that suggest similar policy 
uncertainty. Together with different keywords that indicate economic policy-related uncertainty, 
these components proxy the level of general economic uncertainty in each country measured 
monthly. High EPU values show higher economic uncertainty, while low EPU values show lower 
economic uncertainty in each month. We adopt the EPU index at both the local market level and 
the global market levels to examine how each level of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) 
influences the cross-listing decisions of firms.  
 
For the cross-listing data, we source data on the monthly values of cross-listings from each sample 
local market in a given month to different host markets from DataStream. Common to the literature, 
we normalize the cross-listing values by the market capitalization values of each local market, which 
controls for the effect of large firms having a better capacity to undertake more cross-listing than 
smaller firms (King and Segal, 2003). Thus, also controlling for the impact of outlier observations. 
We follow Sarkissian and Schill (2016) and consider only firm-initiated cross-listings while 
ignoring all non-equity listing due to data unavailability. By undertaking this exercise, we can only 
study cross-listings that are results of management decisions and not those of agents, in line with 
 
33 Baker et al. (2016) develop and introduce a measure of Economic Policy Uncertainty for 19 countries, which this 




existing studies. We also ignore delisted, merged, and suspended firms as standard in the literature 
(Pagano et al. 2001, Berkman and Nguyen, 2010, and  Karolyi, 2012). Although this might raise 
survival bias concerns, Karolyi (2012) explains that the inclusion of delisted or merged firms might 
lead to miscounting, while a large number of data would be lost. Berkman and Nguyen (2010) 
provide support for the assertion of Karolyi (2012)  and indicate the Sarbanes Oxley Act saw a lot 
of foreign cross-listed firms either delisting from US markets or merging with other local or foreign 
firms to meet the new requirements. Including these firms are likely to lead to erroneous inferences 
and conclusions.  
 
Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics for the value of cross-listing, local EPU, and global 
EPU.  We observe relatively similar averages of 2.05 local EPU for larger countries, including the 
US, UK, Germany, and Canada. This initial summary could be because of the limited policy changes 
in these countries (Van Stel and Suddle, 2008). Similarly, we also observe that the standard 
deviation of cross-listing for all countries is around 1 except Korea. This exception could be 
explained by the strong influence the Korean government has on the internationalization and cross-
listing decisions of firms (Kim, 2003). We also observe relatively higher maximum cross-listing 
values for the US and UK, which is expected as the US, and the UK have shown continuous higher 
and increasing cross-listing in other foreign markets (Sarkissian and Schill, 2016). For the standard 
deviation of local EPU, we observe considerable variations, which could be an indication of the 
differences in the economic characteristics of each sample country.    For the UK, we see particularly 
the highest local EPU value, which could be due to national events, including the BREXIT 
referendum, which spurred the level of uncertainty about the future economic prospects after 
BREXIT (Baker et al. 2016). From the global EPU values, we observe mean values that are similar 
to those of local EPU for smaller economies (Sweden, Spain, Korea, France, and Ireland) except 
Italy. Larger economies (US, UK, Germany, Japan, Canada) display larger local EPU than global. 





Table 4. 1: Country-wise Descriptive Statistics 
Country Variables Mean Median Max. Min. Std. 
Dev. 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Australia EPU 1.94 1.95 2.52 1.41 0.20 0.07 3.49 
 CL 2.87 2.94 5.72 0.35 1.09 -0.20 2.78 
Canada EPU 2.05 2.06 2.65 1.48 0.22 0.03 2.58 
 CL 3.15 3.24 5.99 0.09 0.98 -0.45 3.74 
France EPU 2.05 2.06 2.65 1.05 0.28 -0.35 3.07 
 CL 3.66 3.75 7.44 0.51 1.15 0.07 3.23 
Germany EPU 2.05 2.05 2.66 1.45 0.20 -0.11 2.83 
 CL 3.50 3.46 7.84 0.38 1.30 0.26 3.22 
Ireland EPU 1.95 1.98 2.37 1.30 0.25 -0.63 2.88 
 CL 3.17 3.22 7.25 0.46 1.19 0.47 4.94 
Italy EPU 2.05 2.09 2.39 1.50 0.15 -0.67 3.11 
 CL 3.36 3.31 6.09 -0.02 0.99 -0.39 4.01 
Japan EPU 1.99 1.98 2.38 1.69 0.13 0.60 3.32 
 CL 3.87 3.97 6.92 1.26 0.92 -0.13 3.36 
Korea EPU 1.96 1.96 2.61 1.35 0.23 -0.06 2.61 
 CL 3.89 3.90 4.35 3.20 0.41 -0.56 2.40 
Netherlands EPU 1.97 1.99 2.37 1.43 0.13 -0.33 4.97 
 CL 3.58 3.59 6.87 0.25 1.06 -0.15 3.67 
Spain EPU 1.92 1.82 2.61 1.37 0.19 0.86 3.98 
 CL 0.73 2.00 1.20 0 1.41 3.46 19.89 
Sweden EPU 1.98 1.99 2.29 1.73 0.09 -0.16 2.67 
 CL 3.11 3.09 5.73 0.93 0.98 0.13 2.65 
UK EPU 2.00 1.89 3.06 1.40 0.29 0.81 3.02 
 CL 4.36 2.00 8.10 0 7.69 6.03 52.30 
US EPU 2.02 2.00 2.45 1.65 0.15 0.38 2.91 
 CL 4.73 4.65 9.08 1.26 1.26 0.66 4.94 
Global EPU 1.98 1.93 2.45 1.71 0.14 0.84 3.72 
Notes: EPU is the monthly local Economic Policy Uncertainty index for each sample country; CL is the monthly 











4.4 Empirical Analysis 
 
4.4.1 Granger Causality   
 
This study examines how economic policy uncertainty influences the cross-listing decisions 
of firms. We start our analysis by first adopting the Granger Causality methodology introduced by 
Engle and Granger (1987). This method detects the causal relationship between global EPU and 
cross-listing and then local EPU and cross-listing.  Granger Causality examines the correlation 
between present values of cross-listing decisions of firms and the present and past values of 
economic policy uncertainty34. The Granger Causality estimation model is expressed as: 
 
𝐶𝐿𝑡 = 𝑎1 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝐶𝐿𝑡−𝑗 + 
𝑘
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡−𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 
𝑘
𝑗=1                                                 (1) 
 
where 𝐶𝐿𝑡 is the monthly log value of cross-listing from a given country to different host markets 
at a given time. 𝐶𝐿𝑡−𝑗 is the lag of 𝐶𝐿𝑡,  𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡−𝑗 is the lag aggregate economic policy uncertainty 
value for each given country, while 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term in Equation (1).  
 
Table 4.2 shows the Granger Causality estimation results between local EPU and cross-
listing and also indicates those between global EPU and cross-listing. The results suggest that global 
EPU granger causes cross-listing for firms from Japan, Korea, Sweden, and Australia. We also 
observe that for firms from Australia, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Korea, and the Netherlands, local 
EPU granger causes cross-listing. Though we are unable to conclude on the impact of either global 
or local EPU on the cross-listing decisions, we can generalize from Table 4.2 that firms from smaller 
economies tend to be influenced by both global and local EPUs. These results further suggest, in 
line with the cross-listing literature, that firms cross-list on foreign markets to benefit from the better 
 
34 Following Cheung and Lai (1995) and common to the application of the Granger causality methodology and time 
series analysis, we test for unit root in the data using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (Case et al. 2000) test and find that 




economic conditions (Baker et al. 2002, Dodd, 2013, and Korczak and Korczak, 2013).  We 
postulate that EPUs strongly captures these economic conditions. However, the results from the 




Table 4. 2: Granger Causality Test 
Country Global_EPU Local_EPU 
Australia 3.32*** 2.49** 
Canada 1.09 1.24 
France 1.06 0.23 
Germany 0.34 2.02* 
Ireland 1.32 2.61** 
Italy 1.52 0.25*** 
Japan 2.50* 0.435 
Korea 3.87** 0.03*** 
Netherlands 0.49 4.72*** 
Spain 0.89 0.97 
Sweden 0.99*** 1.49 
UK 0.89 0.94 
US 1.71 0.49 
Notes: The table prints the F-statistics that show whether Global EPU or Local EPU  
Granger cause cross-listing.  The dependent variable for the Granger Causality model  
is CL, which is the value of the cross-listings from the sample countries for each month  
from January 1990 to December 2016. *, ** and *** indicate that the F-tests are  














 4.4.2 Quantile on Quantile Estimation 
 
Although the results from the Granger Causality test highlight how elements of both local 
and global could predict cross-listing decisions, the results do not provide strong evidence of the 
causal relationship. We adopt a Quantile on Quantile Regression (QQR, henceforth) approach to 
curbing this.  
 
The QQR approach, as introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978), provides a scope to 
examine how the quantiles of a given variable influence those of another variable based on a blend 
of nonparametric and quantile estimation. Generally regarded as an extension to the OLS estimation 
approach, the quantile regression distinguishes itself by showing the dependencies between two 
variables at different quantile distributions. Thus, quantile regressions estimate the impact at the 
tails of the distribution of the dependent variable, enabling a comprehensive examination of the 
effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. The nonparametric component of the 
QQR model allows for the dimensionality difficulty linked with the nonparametric model. Thus, 
adopting the QQR approach offers the ability to examine the dependence of one variable on another, 
showing a piece of more detailed information on the relationship compared to the OLS, among other 
standard approaches. 
  
For this study, we set up a QQR model that seeks to examine how local and global EPU 





∅                                (1) 
 
where 𝐶𝐿𝑡 proxies the total value of shares cross-listed from a given country in month 𝑡.  𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡 
represents the local or global Economic Policy Uncertainty value or a given country in month 𝑡. ∅ 
is the ∅𝑡ℎ quantile of the conditional distribution of cross-listing while  𝜀𝑡




conditional  ∅𝑡ℎ quantile equals zero. Following Sim and Zhou (2015) 𝛽∅ (.) is allowed to be 
unknown, given that we are unable to associate any prior information for the cross-listing and EPU 
relationship. 
 
To examine how the ∅𝑡ℎ quantile of local and global EPUs relate to the 𝑡ℎ quantile of cross-
listing, we study Eq. (1) in the neighborhood of 𝐸𝑃𝑈𝜏. With 𝛽∅ (.) unknown, we estimate the 







𝜏)                                      (2) 
 
where 𝛽∅ is a proxy that represents the marginal effect and a partial derivation of 𝛽∅(𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡) relating 
to 𝐸𝑃𝑈. It could also be regarded similar to the slope coefficient in a linear regression setup. Both 
𝛽∅(𝐸𝑃𝑈𝜏) and 𝛽∅
′
(𝐸𝑃𝑈𝜏) are functions of  ∅ and 𝜏 are functions and can, therefore, be expressed 
as 𝛽0(∅, 𝜏)  and 𝛽1(∅, 𝜏) respectively. With this in mind, Equation (2) can then be rewritten as 
 
𝛽∅(𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡) ≈ 𝛽0(∅, 𝜏) + 𝛽1(∅, 𝜏)(𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡 − 𝐸𝑃𝑈
𝜏)                            (3) 
 
We can also modify Eq. (1) by replacing the derivation from Eq. (3) into Eq. (1) which provides the 
expression: 
 
𝐶𝐿𝑡 = 𝛽0(∅, 𝜏) + 𝛽1(∅, 𝜏)(𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡 − 𝐸𝑃𝑈
𝜏)  + 𝜀𝑡
∅                            (4) 
  
where Eq. (4) provides the quantile on quantile dependence between the cross-listing decisions of 
firms and local and global EPU. However, estimating Eq. (4) requires replacing 𝐸𝑃𝑈𝑡 with an 
estimated proxy 𝐸𝑃𝑈?̂? while replacing  𝐸𝑃𝑈















)                                   (5) 
 
Where 𝜌𝜃(𝜇) proxies the quantile loss function while ℎ represents the kernel bandwidth parameter. 
To weigh the observations in the neighborhood of 𝐸𝑃𝑈𝜏, we adopt the Gaussian Kernel approach. 
This approach is widely used in finance and economics studies for its simple computation and 
efficiency. The Gaussian Kernel approach is symmetric around zero and allocates low weights to 
observations farther away from the neighborhood of 𝐸𝑃𝑈?̂? based on bandwidth ℎ. The weights are 
inverse to the distance of 𝐸𝑃𝑈?̂? from 𝐸𝑃𝑈?̂?.  
 
Common to most approaches, the selection of a suitable bandwidth could prove problematic. 
Specifically, while choosing a small bandwidth could reduce bias estimates, it increases the 
variances. On the other hand, the selection of a large bandwidth could increase the bias estimate but 
reduce the variance.  Thus, the choice of a bandwidth that minimizes both the bias and variance is 












4.4.3 Quantile on Quantile Regression Results  
 
 
This section presents the estimation results of the QQR approach adopted in this study. The 
approach shows the dependence between cross-listing decisions of firms and local and global EPUs. 
Estimating this relationship using the QQR approach requires the selection of quantiles of local and 
global EPU (indexed by 𝜏) while showing how such 𝜏-quantiles of local and global EPU influences 
the ∅-quantiles of cross-listing. Given that we are interested in how local and global EPUs affect 
the cross-listing decision, we begin our analysis by investigating the dependence between local EPU 
and cross-listing. The results of the QQR approach are reported in the two-dimensional plots 
presented in Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1 provides three detailed results about the dependence between cross-listing and 
local EPUs, which the Granger Causality estimations are unable to reveal. First, we report a positive 
(sea blue color) relationship between the quantiles of Local EPUs of most of the sample countries 
and the quantiles of the outbound cross-listing from those countries. The results suggest that periods 
of high economic uncertainty encourage foreign listing. This finding is in line with the existing 
literature that argues that macroeconomic conditions play a significant role in the decision to cross-
list, as firms seek foreign listing to raise foreign funds (e.g., Hargis and Ramanlal, 1998, Silva and 
Chávez, 2008, Hostak, Lys, Yang, and Carr, 2013, and Korczak and Korczak 2013). The findings 
also provide supporting evidence to the body of literature that reports that cross-listing is motivated 
by poorly functioning local markets. Second, notwithstanding the reported general positive 
dependence, we observe considerable heterogeneity across the sample countries. A natural reason 
could be either the variation in the local market characteristics, including size and level of 
competition for funding (e.g., Pagano et al. 2002).  
 
Third, we find significant variations of the slope coefficient (𝛽∅) at different quantiles of 




between local EPU and cross-listing is subject to the magnitude of local EPU shocks and potentially 
the ability of the local market to absorb such shocks. It is worth noting that while Figure 4.1 shows 
a generally positive (sea blue) dependence between local EPU and cross-listing, the relationship is 
most potent at extreme local EPU levels. This finding suggests that firms decide to cross-list when 
local EPU is at its highest whereas, low and medium local EPU might not generate significant cross-
listing decisions. The results provide support to the arguments of Korczak and Korczak (2013). 
They document that poor local market conditions foster cross-listing decisions but also report that 
the magnitude of cross-listing reduces as fundamentals in the local market improve.  
 
At the country level, we report a pattern for both developed markets and developing markets. 
Specifically, we find that the most substantial connection between local EPU and cross-listing is 
shown in weaker markets. In contrast, more advanced equity markets such as the US, UK, and 
Germany show a limited influence of local EPU. While market size, among other market 
characteristics, can be cited as a potential reason for this finding, these markets are among the first 
choice for cross-listing. Thus, local EPU is more likely to influence the inflows of cross-listings 
than outflows (Doidge et al. 2009). It is also essential to indicate that Korea, in particular, does not 
have enough quantile observations to draw any substantial conclusions. 
 
Similar to Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2 provides a two-dimensional presentation of the Quantile 
on Quantile estimation of the relationship between global EPU and cross-listing. Mainly, Figure 
4.2 shows the relationship between the quantiles of global EPU and the quantiles of cross-listing 
for each given sample country. Figure 4.2 provides interesting results from three perspectives; 
general, quantile, and country perspectives. We observe a general negative relationship between 
global EPU and cross-listing decisions. This finding suggests that firms are not motivated to cross-
list when global economic policy uncertainty is high. A possible explanation is that periods of high 
global EPU generally indicates that most potential host markets are likely to be facing similar high 




given the costs involved in cross-listing (Domowitz et al. 1998; Lang et al. 2003; Khurana et al. 
2007; Choi et al. 2009). Another potential explanation is the fact that firms may reduce their 
investment expenditure during periods of high global EPU, which might reduce the need to seek 
foreign funds through cross-listing. 
 
We also document significant variations in the dependence for different quantiles of both 
global EPU and cross-listing. Similar to Figure 4.1, this finding suggests that different global EPU 
shocks result in different shocks in cross-listing. Higher global EPU (higher quantiles of global 
EPU) discourages high cross-listing (higher quantiles of cross-listing). We further note that this 
relationship becomes weaker at lower quantiles of both global EPU and cross-listing. Our results 
suggest that while higher global EPU may signal higher general global uncertainty, low to medium 
global EPU may indicate that there are still host markets that might be doing well enough to 
encourage cross-listing from some markets. Thus, the dependence between global EPU and cross-
listing is more pronounced as global uncertainty heightens.  
 
A country-level examination reveals the role of country dynamics in the global EPU and 
cross-listing relationship. While we observe the most potent negative relationship at higher 
quantiles of global EPU and cross-listing for most sample countries, some countries show mild 
impact. Consistent with Figure 4.1, we find that larger economies tend to be less affected by global 
EPU compared to smaller economies. In particular, the US, UK, Germany, and Canada show the 
most substantial dependence when global EPU is approaching its highest rather than at its highest. 
A possible reason could be that these markets tend to be net transmitters of EPU compared to smaller 
economies, which are net receivers (Klößner and Sekkel 2014, Yin and Han, 2014, and Bernal, 
Gnabo, and Guilmin, 2016).  
 
Though the QQR approach provides a comprehensive picture of the relationship between 




relationship at a given period. In this regard, a QQR approach could be regarded as similar to a 
cross-sectional estimation that tests the relationship between variables at a given time. Thus, the 
QQR approach is unable to show the dynamics in this relationship over time. 




Figure 4.1: Quantile on Quantile Estimation for Local EPU and Cross-Listing 
   
   




   
Notes: Figure 4.1 is a two-dimensional estimation showing a pairwise dependence between local EPU (LEPU) and cross-listing (CL) for each sample country.  
Warmer (red) spots show the highest positive dependence, while colder (blue) spots show the highest negative dependence between local EPU and  





















Notes: Figure 4.2 is a two-dimensional estimation showing a pairwise dependence between global EPU (GEPU) and cross-listing (CL) for each sample country.  
Warmer (red) spots show the highest positive dependence, while colder (blue) spots show the highest negative dependence between global EPU and  





4.4.4 Wavelet Coherence  
 
We further test the relationship between local EPU and cross-listing and global EPU and 
cross-listing using a wavelet coherence approach. Unlike the QQR approach, which only shows the 
relationship at only different frequencies, the wavelet coherence breaks down the sample into 
periods and frequencies. It detects periods where two-time series of interest co-move. As a result, 
the wavelet coherence approach shows the nature of co-movement between two-time series over a 
specified time and at different frequencies. Thus, we measure the co-movement between two sets 
of paired variables, which is similar to the squared correlation coefficient in linear regression. We 
first measure the correlation between local EPU and cross-listing and then global EPU and cross-
listing. This tells us how these two sets of paired time-series co-move in time-frequency space and 
produces a wavelet coherence coefficient between 0 and 1. Values closer to 1 suggest a stronger 
relationship, while values closer to 0 reflect a minimal connection.   
 









                                          (1) 
 
where scale 𝑠 and location 𝑢 are at time 𝑡, √𝑠 is a normalization factor that provides unit variance 
of the wavelet. Scales and frequencies on a wavelet have a negative relationship, implying that 
higher ranges denote lower frequencies. This is given with the notion that a wavelet has a mean  of 
zero and is generally normalized in a way that ∫ −∞ + ∞𝜓(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 = 0 and∫ −∞ + ∞𝜓2(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 = 1. 
To explain the wavelet coherence methodology, we begin by introducing the cross-wavelet 
transform, following Cai Tian, Yuan, and Hamori (2017). According to Torrence and Compo 





𝑊𝑥𝑦(𝑢, 𝑠) = 𝑊𝑥(𝑢, 𝑠)𝑊𝑦(𝑢, 𝑠)                             (2) 
 
where the continuous wavelet transforms of 𝑥(𝑡) and 𝑦(𝑡)  are given as  𝑊𝑥(𝑢, 𝑠) and 𝑊𝑦(𝑢, 𝑠) 
respectively. 𝑊𝑥𝑦(𝑢, 𝑠) shows the periods and areas where time series, 𝑥, and  𝑦 covary at each 
given scale.  
 
Given this background, the wavelet coherence seeks to identify areas in a combined time 
and frequency spectra where both time series  𝑥  and  𝑦 co-move even if there is standard power of 
co-movement. Similar to Vacha and Barunik (2012), the squared wavelet coherence coefficient is 
expressed as: 
 




                          (3) 
 
where 𝑆 denotes the smoothing operator given that the result of the above equation, Equation (3), 
should be within the boundaries of zero and one, i.e. 0 ≤ 𝑅2 ≤ 1. This further indicates that values 
closer to one show evidence of a high correlation between 𝑥  and  𝑦, while values closer to zero 











4.4.5 Wavelet Coherence Analysis  
 
This section presents the analysis of the wavelet coherence results for the sample countries, 
highlighting the correlation between EPUs and cross-listing decisions. The results for all sample 
countries are presented in Figures 4.3 and 4.4. The y-axis of the graphs refers to the frequency of 
correlation (i.e., scale). The y-axis shows the frequency, with high frequencies showing a stronger 
co-movement between the two series. The x-axis, which is expressed in years, shows the period 
(i.e., 1990 to 2016) where the series correlate. Regions with warmer colors are closer to 1, showing 
a higher correlation between the series. Warmer colored areas closer to the bottom of the graph 
show high correlation at higher frequencies, while warmer colored areas closer to the top of the 
graph show high correlation at lower frequencies. Warmer colors closer to the right show a high 
correlation at the end of the sample period. In comparison, warmer colors that are closer to the left 
show a high correlation at the beginning of the sample period. 
 
 Regarding the level of significance, areas in the white contoured shape represent 5% 
significance (Rua and Nunes, 2009). Arrows pointing to the right indicate in-phase, left-pointing 
arrows indicate anti-phase, while downward-pointing indicates leading with upward showing 
lagging. 
 
Figure 4.3 shows evidence of co-movement between local EPU and cross-listing. In 
contrast, Figure 4.4 shows those of global EPU and cross-listing for all sample countries (Australia, 
Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK, and the 
US). We observe evidence of the dependence of cross-listing decisions on the level of local EPU 
and global EPU for all countries. This dependence is found across several periods and frequencies. 
Specifically, we report stronger dependence during periods from 1990 to 2002 between global EPU 
and cross-listing. However, we generally see limited evidence of this dependence between local 
EPU and cross-listing from the period 1998 to 2004. This could be an indication of firms being 




emerging concept during these periods (Domowitz et al. 1998). We observe a stronger positive 
(arrows pointing rightward) relationship between local EPU and cross-listing for smaller markets. 
In contrast, larger markets show little influence of local EPU in the cross-listing decisions. For 
example, Australia, Italy, Korea, and Spain show a strong influence of Local EPU in the mid-1990s 
and early 2000s at medium to high frequencies. At the same time, the US and UK exhibit limited 
evidence. 
 
From Figure 4.4, we observe that relatively smaller economies in our sample, including the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and Korea, exhibit high negative (warmer color) co-movement between 
global EPU and the cross-listing decisions. This contrasts with larger economies like the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Germany that show limited co-movement similar to the Granger 
Causality analysis. However, for Australia, we observe high positive co-movement between global 
EPU and cross-listing decisions during various periods with the strongest between 1996 and 2003. 
Generally, these results show that when firms from smaller or less developed markets are uncertain 
about global economic policies and conditions, they tend not to list on foreign markets. Our findings 
are consistent with the cross-listing literature, which shows that the developmental prospects of the 
host/foreign markets are vital considerations for the cross-listing decisions of firms (Hargis and 
Ramanlal, 1998, Korczak and Korczak 2013, and Azzimonti, 2018).   
 
Overall, our results infer two main issues.  First, uncertainty about the economic policy in 
the local market motivates firms to cross-list abroad. Second, uncertainty about global economic 
policies makes firms reluctant to cross-list abroad. Precisely, our results follow the argument that 
poor economic conditions in the local country encourage firms to seek international listing as a 
means of finding markets with more robust fundamentals, among other well-researched benefits.  
These findings are comparable to those from the foreign direct investment literature that shows that 
investors seek foreign investment opportunities in the presence of poor economic conditions in their 





It is also interesting to again observe that countries with smaller markets tend to show more 
co-movement between EPU and cross-listing in general, similar to the Granger Causality and QQR 
analyses and those of Feldstein (1999). In his paper, he shows that smaller economies tend to be 
affected by global events as they are predominantly trade-reliant on bigger economies, thus, making 
them receivers of shocks and spillovers. Supporting this line of argument, Calvo and Reinhart 
(1996) indicate that smaller economies are more vulnerable to both regional and global events due 
to such trade connections. 
 
From a methodological perspective, it is essential to note that our findings suggest that the 
wavelet coherence methodology can observe specific correlations that are not captured by the 
Granger Causality methodology as shown by Engle and Granger (1987), Torrence and Compo 
(1998), and Cai et al. (2017). Again, while the Quantile on Quantile is a contemporary approach 
and may offer important details of the aggregate dependency between the quantiles of two variables 














Figure 4.3: Wavelet Coherence Analysis for Local EPU versus Cross-Listing 
 
  










Notes: Figure 4.3 is a Wavelet coherence estimation showing a pairwise correlation between Local EPU and cross-listing (CL) sample countries.  
Warmer spots show high co-movement between the two variables, while colder (blue) spots show low co-movement between the pair variables.  






Figure 4.4: Wavelet Coherence Analysis for Global EPU versus Cross-Listing 
 
  




   
   
 
  
Notes: Figure 4.4 is a Wavelet coherence estimation showing a pairwise correlation between Global EPU and cross-listing (CL) sample countries.  
Warmer spots show high co-movement between the two variables, while colder (blue) spots show low co-movement between the pair variables.   






The role of policy uncertainty in corporate decisions and strategies remains a growing area 
of research and discussion, especially in recent years. Recent studies argue that while market 
characteristics influence corporate decisions and strategies, policy uncertainties tend to have a 
similar influence (Kang et al. 2014, Wang et al. 2014, Gulen and Ion, 2015, Zhang et al. 2015, and 
Bonaime et al. 2018). These studies argue that market characteristics are outcomes of government 
policies, hence the documented impact on corporate decisions and strategies. Previous studies focus 
on how economic policy uncertainty in the local market impact firm spending and capital structure. 
The current study contributes to the ongoing discussions. Still, it differentiates itself from previous 
studies by investigating how and to what extent economic policy uncertainty (EPU) at both the local 
and global markets influence the cross-listing decisions. To this end, we collect firm and country-
level data for 13 countries selected purely based on the availability of the economic policy 
uncertainty data and the market value of shares cross-listed from the year 1990 to 2016.  
 
We follow the existing literature and recent discussions and make some significant 
propositions that serve as the premise of our examination. First, periods of high local EPU may 
discourage firms from borrowing from lenders as lenders are likely to increase the risk premium 
and demand higher interests.  This is due to the increased risk of default increases during periods of 
higher local EPU. Second, high local EPU may also lead to firms reducing their investment 
expenditure.  Such a reduction in investment might reduce the need to raise foreign capital through 
cross-listing. Consequently, periods of high local EPU is likely to either encourage cross-listing due 
to the higher cost of funding in the local market or reduce cross-listing activities due to the reduced 
need for foreign capital. This study addresses these issues and contributes to the ongoing discussions 





The empirical examination begins with a Granger Causality methodology, which is aimed 
at testing the causality between EPUs and the cross-listing decisions of firms. While the results from 
the Granger Causality test are not strong enough, they hint that local and global Economic Policy 
Uncertainties are essential in the cross-listing decisions of firms. Given this weakness, we 
implement two contemporary approaches; Quantile on Quantile Regression and Wavelet Coherence 
approaches. The Quantile on Quantile Regression approach provides an examination of the 
relationship between the quantiles of both local and global EPUs and the quantiles of the cross-
listing decisions of firms. The Wavelet Coherence approach provides an arguably complete picture 
of this relationship by showing how local and global EPU influence the cross-listing decisions of 
firms at different frequencies and different periods.  
 
Results from the QQR approach provides important findings. We document a positive 
dependence between the quantiles of local EPUs of countries and the quantiles of the outbound 
cross-listing from those countries. The results suggest that periods of high economic uncertainty 
encourages foreign listing. This finding is in line with the existing literature that argues that 
macroeconomic conditions play a significant role in the decision to cross-list, as firms seek foreign 
listing to raise foreign funds. Other findings from the QQR approach suggest that firms decide to 
cross-list when local EPU is at its highest whereas, low and medium local EPU do not generate 
significant cross-listing decisions. We also document that the most robust connection between local 
EPU and cross-listing is shown in weaker markets. In comparison, larger markets such as the US, 
UK, and Germany show a limited influence of local EPU. While market size, among other market 
characteristics, can be cited as a potential reason for this finding, these markets are among the first 
choice for cross-listing.  
 
The findings from the Wavelet Coherence approach are indicative that uncertainty about the 
economic policy in the local market motivates firms to cross-list abroad. They also show that 




our results support the argument that poor economic conditions in the local country encourage firms 
to seek international listing as a means of finding markets with better fundaments, among other 
well-researched benefits.  These findings are comparable to those from the foreign direct investment 
literature that shows that investors seek foreign investment opportunities in the presence of poor 
economic conditions in their local markets. 
 
Together, both the results from the QQR and Wavelet Coherence approaches reveal that 
local EPU is positively associated with cross-listing decisions. In contrast, global EPU is negatively 
associated with cross-listing decisions. Our results further propose that the size/characteristics of 
the local market mitigate this association. We document that smaller markets exhibit more impact 
from Local EPU using the Granger Causality estimation. Although the results from the Quantile on 
Quantile Regression and the Wavelet Coherence approaches are generally similar to those of the 
Granger Causality, we find that the Granger Causality estimation does not capture some co-
movements.  
 
These results provide two important policy implications for policymakers. First, though 
policy uncertainty cannot be entirely avoided, policymakers could create and maintain policy 
transparency as they have consequences on corporate decisions.  Second, the results of this study 
emphasize the relevance of economic policies in the local market in attracting/repelling foreign 














This chapter concludes the thesis and provides two critical summaries. First, it provides an 
overview of the essays presented in this thesis. It highlights the main contributions of each paper 
and draws on them to show the policy implications. Second, it outlines potential future research 
concepts based on some identified limitations of the current thesis. 
Cross-listing has gained importance in corporate decisions with significant reported 
outcomes. Several studies discuss these outcomes and highlight that market characteristics in both 
the local and host markets play a vital role in the generation of these outcomes. An extensive 
literature also shows that peculiar market characteristics in the local and host markets motivate the 
decision to cross-list. However, existing studies provide little consensus on two critical issues. First, 
how dynamics in market characteristics influence cross-listing decisions? Second, how the reported 
outcomes impact other corporate decisions? This thesis presents three essays that investigate these 
issues. 
The first essay discusses the second issue and is underpinned by the existing literature on 
the determinants of dividend smoothing that argue that transparency influence dividend smoothing. 
As foreign firms cross-list in the US, a well-established corporate outcome is an improvement in 
disclosure and transparency due to the disclosure and reporting requirements in the US. Consistent 
with the bonding hypothesis, another significant result is the signaling of a commitment to full 
disclosure and transparency. Therefore, the first essay investigates how commitment to full 
disclosure and improved transparency due to cross-listing influence the dividend smoothing 
strategies of firms. We begin by adopting Lintner’s partial adjustment model to estimate the speed 
of adjustment (SOA), which measures the change in dividends as a result of a change in earnings. 




smoothing by 9.47% after cross-listing. Given the considerable documented variation in dividend 
smoothing practices across different sectors and markets, we categorize our sample by industry and 
economic development of the local market. The findings show an average increase of 7.93% in all 
sectors except for the Agriculture, Electricity, and Administrative industries, which show an 
average decrease of 7.06%. We also report a higher increase of 10.27% in dividend smoothing for 
firms from developed markets compared to the 7.93% increase for firms from developing markets. 
This finding follows the market sophistication argument, which suggests that investors in 
developing economies are generally dividend driven compared to investors in developed 
economies, who are usually more sophisticated in their investments due to differences in market 
liquidity and transaction costs.  
Next, we adopt a variance decomposition approach to investigate how cross-listing in the 
US influences the dividend smoothing channels. Unlike Lintner’s partial adjustment model, we 
examine the smoothing channels for the full sample period, before and after cross-listing using the 
variance decomposition approach. We document a 6% and a 4% increase in the use of investments 
and debt channels, respectively. This finding adds to the literature that postulates that debt and 
investment are primary channels of dividend smoothing.  Following our initial analysis and existing 
research, we examine variations in dividend smoothing channels at the market level.  
Novel to the cross-listing literature, we report that firms from developed economies increase 
the use of investment channels by 13% and reduce the use of investment channels by 8%. The 
unsmoothed shocks to net income decrease by 4%. In comparison, firms from developing 
economies increase the use of investment channels by 23% and reduce the use of debt channels by 
12%. The unsmoothed shock to net income decreased by 11% after cross-listing.  
The examination in the first essay makes essential contributions to the literature. First, the 
paper provides the first insight into how commitment to full disclosure and improved transparency 




development mitigates or fosters dividend smoothing intensity. This contribution further adds to the 
existing literature on the relationship between investor sophistication and corporate decisions. 
Third, unlike previous studies that focus on dividend smoothing channels for different industries, 
the study offers new evidence on dividend smoothing channels and their dynamics at both the 
market development and industry fronts. Fourth, the current study provides new empirical evidence 
that shows the link between payout strategies and other financing decisions. The finding suggests 
that corporate financing decisions are not independent but interlinked with other corporate 
decisions.  The essay provides relevant implications by showing how the dividend policy of a firm 
may change in response to the commitment to full disclosure due to cross-listing and its potential 
impact on dividend-driven investors. By showing the link between dividend smoothing and other 
financing decisions, the study suggests that higher dividend payouts could deprive corporations of 
either growth opportunities or lead to an increase in debt ratios.   
   The second essay builds on existing discussions on the role of market characteristics in 
the cross-listing decision. It examines how specialization in output in the local and host markets 
influence bilateral cross-listing decisions. The essay adopts the gravity model, which suggests that 
economic size and distance determine the choice of trade partners. By utilizing the gravity model, 
we are able to investigate the role specialization in output play in the cross-listing decisions under 
the gravity model conditions.  Before undertaking the analysis, we create a measure of the share of 
cross-listing from one industry in the local market to the same industry in the host market to 
ascertain the bilateral cross-listing values. The essay proceeds by providing a firm level and industry 
level analysis. 
Results from the firm-level analysis show that specialization in the output of the local market 
encourages cross-listing. This finding suggests that the desire to diversify funding sources and the 
unwillingness of managers to compete in the domestic markets for funds motivate cross-listing 




drives firms to seek new markets. We document that firms from local markets that are specialized 
in the output of specific industries pursue cross-listing in host markets that are less specialized in 
the given industry. We also report that firms seek cross-listing in markets that are geographically 
further away from their local market. The findings contradict the advertising effect and the 
proximity preference assertions proposed by previous studies. 
Next, we examine this relationship at the industry level, given the well-documented 
variation in the choice of host markets for different industries. Similar to those at the firm-level, the 
empirical results show that specialization in output in the local market foster cross-listing. Again, 
we report a preference for host markets that are less specialized and further away from the local 
market, further indicating the weakening of the proximity bias. We then implement a Generalized 
Method of Moment (GMM) approach to assess the robustness of the results and report similar 
results as those from the initial analysis. 
The investigations in essay two contribute to the literature and provide policy implications. 
The essay offers the first international examination of how specialization in output influences the 
cross-listing decision at both the firm and industry levels. The findings provide new evidence for 
the weakening of the gravity model conditions in line with recent studies. The results also suggest 
that while specialization in output may be a country-specific characteristic, cross-listing might 
present a spillover channel into other countries that are not specialized in that industry. Again, the 
results offer new supporting evidence to the literature on the relevance of market characteristics in 
the cross-listing decision. 
The third essay follows from essay two and investigates how policy uncertainty influences 
cross-listing decisions. The investigation is motivated by the extensive literature that proposes that 
policy uncertainty impacts corporate decisions similar to market characteristics. A vital element of 




background, the third essay examines how economic policy uncertainty (EPU) in both the local and 
global markets influence the cross-listing decisions of firms.   
The analysis presented in the third essay begins by finding a suitable measure of economic 
policy uncertainty. We resort to the monthly EPU index introduced by Baker et al. (2016), which is 
a weighted average frequency count of news articles that contain words that suggest policy 
uncertainty about a country for each month. Higher EPU values generally indicate higher economic 
uncertainty, while lower EPU values suggest lower economic uncertainty for a given month for 
each sample country. Next, we adopt a Granger Causality approach, which enables us to test the 
causality between the two variables. While results from this examination exhibit the existence of 
causality, the results are weak. To address this, we adopt a Quantile on Quantile Regression (QQR) 
approach and a Wavelet Coherence (WC) approach that allows us to assess the relationship between 
EPU and cross-listing. 
Results from the QQR approach show a positive dependence between the quantiles of local 
EPUs and the quantiles of the outbound cross-listing. The results suggest that periods of high 
economic uncertainty encourage foreign listing. This finding is in line with the existing literature 
that argues that macroeconomic conditions play a significant role in the decision to cross-list. This 
literature indicates that firms seek foreign listing to raise foreign funds and benefits from other 
positive market outcomes. Other findings from the QQR approach suggest that firms decide to 
cross-list when local EPU is at its highest whereas, low and medium local EPU do not generate 
significant cross-listing decisions. We also document that the most substantial connection between 
local EPU and cross-listing is shown in weaker markets. In contrast, more advanced equity markets 
show a limited local EPU influence.  
 
The findings from the Wavelet Coherence approach are indicative that uncertainty about the 
economic policy in the local market motivates firms to cross-list abroad. Secondly, uncertainty 




argument that poor economic conditions in the local country encourage firms to seek international 
listing as a means of finding markets with more robust fundamentals, among other well-researched 
benefits.  These findings are comparable to those from the foreign direct investment literature that 
shows that investors seek foreign investment opportunities in the presence of poor economic 
conditions in their local markets. 
 
Overall, the empirical results reveal that while local EPU is positively associated with cross-
listing decisions, global EPU is negatively associated with cross-listing decisions. This finding 
complements the existing literature that proposes that cross-listing is motivated by the poor 
economic performance of the local market.  However, it also suggests that policy uncertainty can 
decrease managers’ confidence in future economic prospects, resulting in more cross-listing. While 
this suggestion is valid for much of our analysis, we also document that the economic development 
of the local market mitigates the impact of EPU on cross-listing decisions. The results from the 
QQR approach produces similar results to the wavelet coherence approach but shows that the 
association between EPU and cross-listing is uneven across different quantiles of the variables. We 
report that the wavelet coherence approach provides a more detailed picture of this relationship by 
offering both a frequency and time-varying perspective. 
The results from the third easy offer important contributions to the existing literature. They 
provide new evidence on the influence of economic policy uncertainty on corporate decisions. 
However, unlike previous studies that provide single country analysis, it provides an international 
perspective to the discussion, while adopting contemporary approaches. The findings suggest that 
the relationship between policy uncertainty and firm decisions is dynamic across different countries, 
time, and frequencies. The essay also highlights the relevance of market development in mitigating 
policy uncertainty shocks. The empirical results suggest that though policy uncertainty may be 




Together, the three essays presented in this thesis offer essential contributions to the 
literature on the determinants of cross-listing, internationalization, and corporate finance decisions. 
The evidence presented in all three studies highlight the relevance of market characteristics in 
mitigating or encouraging corporate decisions and strategies.  
 
 
5.1 Future Research Areas     
       
   The execution and findings of the essays presented in this thesis suffer limitations and 
indicate room future research on the subject. 
The findings in essay one indicate that cross-listing in the US encourages dividend 
smoothing as firms commit to full disclosure and become more transparent due to the disclosure 
and reporting standards in the US. Recent discussions show that the disclosure requirements vary 
among the different levels of American Depository Receipts (ADRs). For example, cross-listing 
under ADR I will require minimum disclosure compared to ADR II and ADR III, which requires 
comprehensive disclosure. Given this difference, the evidence for dividend smoothing strategies 
may not be similar across all ADR levels. It will be useful to examine how different levels of ADR 
programs influence payout strategies. Again, while the current study considers periodic shocks to 
net income and corporate smoothing strategies, it would be interesting to ascertain how a permanent 
shock to net income will influence the dividend smoothing strategies of cross-listed firms. The 
current study provides evidence of a change in the speed of adjustment after cross-listing, however, 
given the unique dynamics during the GFC period, it could be remarkable to isolate specific periods 
to examine the impact of the global financial crisis on the evidence. 
The second essay shows that specialization in output influences bilateral cross-listing 




could be useful. Also, a sub-sample analysis of developing and developed economies separately 
could be interesting, given the established difference in market development between developing 
and developed markets. Beyond cross-listing, it would be interesting to understand how the inflow 
of foreign firms impacts the competition for funding sources in the host market overtime. The 
findings in the current study suggest the weakening of the gravity model, as shown by recent studies. 
It could be of potential importance to understand whether firms experience similar or superior 
benefits by going further away from their local market. 
The third essay presents significant findings that serve as a foundation for further 
examination. First, the essay utilizes a news-based EPU index to examine the relationship between 
EPU and cross-listing. It would be interesting to investigate whether other policy uncertainty 
indexes, including Twitter Happiness Index, provide similar outcomes. Most of the economies 
studied in the study are developed economies. A sample that includes a larger group of developed 
and developing economies could prove useful to the literature. Future research that allows the study 
of this relationship in a methodological setup with other controls could be interesting.   
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